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GLOBAL PLATFORM GOVERNANCE:




Online intermediaries—search engines, social media platforms, even e-
commerce businesses—are increasingly required to make critical decisions
about free expression, individual privacy, and property rights under do-
mestic law. These requirements arise in contexts that include the right to be
forgotten, hate speech, “terrorist” speech, and copyright and intellectual
property. At the same time, these disputes about online speech are increas-
ingly borderless. Many laws targeting online speech and privacy are explic-
itly extraterritorial in scope. Even when not, some courts have ruled that
they have jurisdiction to enforce compliance on a global scale. And gov-
ernments are also demanding that platforms remove content—on a global
scale—that violates platforms’ terms of service, leading to the deletion of
information that is legal in one jurisdiction and illegal in the next.
Existing accounts of platforms’ governance role are incomplete and un-
satisfying. These accounts tend to neglect the impact of cross-border and
transnational pressures upon company policies that affect user rights. Ob-
servers have also tended to mischaracterize or underspecify the kinds of
action that platforms take as governments outsource certain decision-mak-
ing functions and attempt to extend domestic law and norms beyond terri-
torial limits.
The Article contends that platforms are operating as privately owned bu-
reaucracies charged with overseeing and implementing complex statutory
and constitutional schemes. Platforms are engaged in both rulemaking and
adjudication: they develop and promulgate regulations, statements of pol-
icy, and guidance that govern free expression and privacy online, and adju-
dicate disputes concerning those fundamental rights.
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That these governance mechanisms rely on private actors to be carried
out does not, by itself, suggest that they are not legitimate. But basic princi-
ples of administrative law—transparency, participation, reason-giving, and
review—remain essential to ensure that platform governance is accountable
to the public. These protections are largely, if not entirely, absent from the
status quo, due in part to longstanding industry practice—and in part to
legal obstacles that prevent platforms from instituting the kinds of rigorous
safeguards that are urgently needed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
IN the last several years, providers of Internet communication serviceshave come under increasing pressures from governments across theworld to police speech and privacy online. Companies large and small
alike have been enlisted by governments—both autocratic and demo-
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cratic—to aid in efforts to stem the tide of nasty content, to assist in law
enforcement investigations, to protect and vindicate privacy and intellec-
tual property rights, and to police propaganda, misinformation, and “fake
news.” At times, companies have resisted these efforts, pushing back on
government demands that go too far.1 Frequently, however, they cooper-
ate with governments and become crucial participants in efforts to make
the Internet a better, more pleasant, and safer place.
These demands for cooperation are both geographically and ideologi-
cally diverse, and reflect varying degrees of government-imposed obliga-
tions on industry to “moderate content”—in other words, to remove
unwanted speech. Increasingly, they also reflect mounting pressures on
platforms not just to block or filter content in a particular jurisdiction, but
rather to delete it on a global scale. Indeed, today’s battles to control
online speech are, in many cases, explicitly global in nature. At times,
local regulators overtly attempt to extend their influence over the global
Internet by fighting legal battles over jurisdiction.2 But often, platforms
play a global role in governing speech simply by enforcing their own
terms of service (ToS)—applicable to all users, no matter where they are
located.3
States have, accordingly, begun to exert a new kind of pressure on plat-
forms. Rather than simply seeking to enforce domestic law online—
whether globally or locally—states are leveraging the infrastructure of
private ordering that has long characterized the global web in order to
carry out their own policy preferences. In essence, platforms are acting as
regulators or bureaucracies—implementing the favored policy solutions
of executive and legislative branch actors—on a global scale. Indeed,
platforms are performing quintessentially administrative functions. Like
administrative agencies, platforms set rules by promulgating internal reg-
ulations about user speech and privacy.4 And as the number of disputes
about online rights grows beyond that which domestic courts can handle,
1. See Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 115
(2018) (arguing that technology companies have “powerful incentives to resist government
surveillance,” particularly after the Snowden revelations); Julie Cohen, Law for the Plat-
form Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 173 (2017).
2. See, e.g., Request for a Preliminary Ruling from the Conseil d’E´tat (France), Case
C-507/17, Google Inc. v. Comm’n Nationale de l’Informatique et des Liberte´s (CNIL),
2017 O.J. (C 347) 23 (presenting the question of whether search results must be delisted on
all of the domains used by Google globally).
3. See Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censor-
ship Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1055–57 (2018) (observing, as a general matter,
that ToS are applicable across the globe); see also Rebecca MacKinnon, Andi Wilson, &
Liz Woolery, Internet Freedom at a Crossroads: Recommendations for the 45th President’s
Internet Freedom Agenda, OPEN TECH. INST. 12 (Dec. 2016), https://www.newamerica.org/
oti/policy-papers/internet-freedom-crossroads/ (describing how Silicon Valley has re-
sponded to government pressure by “amending their terms of service and strengthening
enforcement measures against a wide range of content that advocates or is associated with
violent extremism”).
4. See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1269
(2017) (arguing, in the context of domestic commercial interactions, that digital in-
termediaries regulate “by influencing behavior in ways similar to public actors.”).
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platforms increasingly create adjudicatory and appellate mechanisms to
absorb this responsibility as well.5 While platforms have acknowledged
that their rules and policies in some ways serve as the “law” of online
content,6 a closer look at the relationship between platforms and govern-
ments around the world is warranted in light of this increasing entangle-
ment and overlap.
These developments are noteworthy because this relationship—what
this Article calls “global platform governance”—exhibits several account-
ability deficits. States are increasingly coercing online platforms and in-
termediaries to instantiate and enforce public policy preferences
regarding online speech and privacy through private regulation—includ-
ing not only ToS but also hash-sharing and other purportedly cooperative
arrangements—that lacks critical accountability mechanisms. These coer-
cive measures convert what might otherwise be private action into heter-
odox, hybrid public-private governance arrangements in which state and
private power are commingled. In short, governments can avoid responsi-
bility for their policy preferences if they force platforms to carry their
water.
This dynamic is of particular concern because the Internet’s global
reach heightens the likelihood of jurisdictional conflict concerning pri-
vacy and speech rights.7 There is little agreement about either the sub-
stance or the process by which platforms and governments should make
critical decisions about civil liberties online. Fundamental divisions exist
among governments, industry, and civil society about the appropriate role
that communications platforms and online intermediaries ought to play in
governing online speech. On the one hand, the companies that have built
and maintained platforms for communication have also long created and
applied policies and ToS that govern what users can—and cannot—say
online. Equipped with this experience, companies themselves may be the
actors best suited to make decisions about governing online speech. On
the other hand, many of the most urgent decisions about online speech
and privacy implicate fundamental human and constitutional rights, sug-
5. See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 547,
555–59 (2016) (describing how Amazon, eBay, and other platforms act as adjudicators for
consumer purchases).
6. Alexis C. Madrigal, Inside Facebook’s Fast-Growing Content-Moderation Effort,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/02/what-
facebook-told-insiders-about-how-it-moderates-posts/552632/ (describing how Facebook
employees “emphasized the similarity between what Facebook is doing and what govern-
ment does”); see also Ingrid Burrington, Could Facebook Be Tried for Human-Rights
Abuses?, ATLANTIC (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/
12/could-facebook-be-tried-for-war-crimes/548639/ (quoting Susan Benesch, who called
terms of service the “Constitution” of online rights).
7. See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311,
319 (2002) (“Cross-border interaction obviously is not a new phenomenon, but in an elec-
tronically connected world the effects of any given action may immediately be felt else-
where with no relationship to physical geography at all.”); see also Andrew Keane Woods,
Against Data Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 748 (2016) (noting that, although there
is “very little precedent” regarding cross-border demands for the production of user data,
these demands “are soon to be commonplace”).
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gesting that they should, perhaps, be adjudicated by the government itself
through methods that enshrine values of due process, transparency, and
accountability.
Take, for example, the “right to be forgotten” under European law. In
the 2014 Google Spain case, the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) held that Europe’s Data Protection Directive protected an indi-
vidual’s right to demand that a search engine delete information that is
“inadequate, irrelevant or excessive.”8 In response to the ruling, Google
created a portal to receive and manage requests to delete information,
which it considers on a case-specific basis. Google has developed internal
guidelines for compliance with the Google Spain requirements, adjudi-
cates each request to delete information itself, and employs a specialized
staff that considers the requests. To date, Google has removed nearly
900,000 links.9
Or take the requirements that the European Commission and some
European member states are beginning to impose on platforms in order
to curb hate speech online. In May 2016, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter,
and YouTube implemented a “Code of Conduct” by which they commit-
ted to “have in place clear and effective processes to review notifications
regarding illegal hate speech on their services so they can remove or dis-
able access to such content.”10 Hate speech is disallowed by all four of the
companies’ ToS. Under the Code of Conduct, the companies promised to
“review the majority of valid notifications for removal of illegal hate
speech in less than 24 hours and remove or disable access to such content,
if necessary.”11 Compared to other new laws, the Code of Conduct has a
soft touch: last year, Germany enacted a law requiring social media com-
panies to delete illegal comments within twenty-four hours, or face heavy
fines.12
The right to be forgotten and hate speech examples illustrate an emerg-
ing form of government pressure on platforms: rather than simply com-
pelling intermediaries to delete specific content, governments are foisting
upon platforms increasing responsibility for making legal determinations
regarding speech—a task that might previously have belonged to a court,
administrative agency, or other government body accountable to the pub-
8. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espan˜ola de Proteccio´n de Datos
(AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶¶ 92, 94 [hereinafter Google Spain]; see also Ignacio Cofone,
Google v. Spain: A Right to Be Forgotten, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 4–5 (2015).
9. Search removals under European privacy law, GOOGLE, https://transparencyreport
.google.com/eu-privacy/overview?hl=en [https://perma.cc/H479-RCWK] (last visited Feb.
9, 2019).
10. European Comm’n, Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online
(May 31, 2016) [hereinafter Code of Conduct], http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document
.cfm?doc_id=42985 [https://perma.cc/E7QA-EJBX].
11. Id.
12. Melissa Eddy & Mark Scott, Delete Hate Speech or Pay Up, Germany Tells Social
Media Companies, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/busi
ness/germany-facebook-google-twitter.html [https://perma.cc/G4WB-6C28].
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lic. As a result, intermediaries bear increasing duties to make important
decisions regarding sensitive civil liberties issues.
This Article contributes to a growing literature that explores how tech-
nology companies are functioning alongside states to create and enforce
transnational policy on user speech, privacy, and security.13 Specifically,
the Article takes up two noteworthy developments resulting from this
shift toward private governance. First, by enlisting intermediaries to carry
out their desired policy preferences through ToS or other corporate stan-
dards, governments can give local policy global effect relatively cheaply.
Nonetheless, most scholarly accounts have examined the substantive im-
pact of these private governance arrangements on user speech through a
domestic, not international, lens.14 Second, although states are increas-
ingly compelling platforms to adjudicate users’ speech and privacy rights,
they have stymied platforms’ ability to provide procedural protections
comparable to those that would typically accompany legal adjudications.
The Article illuminates how the application of global administrative law
both casts doubt on the legal sufficiency of existing procedural mecha-
nisms to protect user rights, and points toward some solutions to enhance
the accountability and transparency of platform decision-making.
Part I situates platforms’ new governance role in the context of
cyberlaw’s embrace of private ordering. The premise that private actors
rather than states should set many, if not all, of the rules of engagement
online was fundamental to early cyber-enthusiasts, and even their harsh-
est critics did not seriously dispute that large swaths of the Web should be
self-governed. Indeed, self-governance was posited as a way of resolving
jurisdictional tensions online. But as the Internet grew and became com-
mercialized, platforms became increasingly susceptible to government
control and pressure to extend the reach of local law. The Article exam-
ines two examples from Europe—hate speech and the right to be forgot-
ten—and illustrates that, today, governments are in fact instrumentalizing
platforms’ own internal corporate architecture to instantiate their pre-
ferred policy outcomes.
Platform decision-making on the sensitive human rights and civil liber-
ties issues implicated here has given rise to a number of complaints about
the substance of platform governance and its accountability failures. In
Part II, the Article offers a new way to conceptualize platforms’ partici-
pation in transnational speech and privacy regulation, and a path forward
13. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 3; Eyal Benvenisti, Upholding Democracy Amid the
Challenges of New Technology: What Role for Global Governance?, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9
(2018); Julie Cohen, supra note 1; Jennifer Daskal, Borders and Bits, 71 VAND. L. REV.
179, 219 (2018); Daphne Keller, Who Do You Sue? State and Platform Hybrid Power Over
Online Speech (Hoover Inst., Stanford Univ., Aegis Series Paper No. 1902, 2019); Andrew
Keane Woods, Litigating Data Sovereignty, 128 YALE L.J. 328 (2018); Evelyn Mary Aswad,
The Future of Freedom of Expression Online, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 26 (2018); Kristen
Eichensehr, Digital Switzerlands, 167 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
14. See, e.g., Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1599 (2018); Kyle Langvardt, Regulat-
ing Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353, 1358 (2018).
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to hold them accountable in this role. When Internet platforms engage in
policing and moderating content online, they engage in a form of private
governance that reaches across geographic borders. These governance ar-
rangements exhibit a complex web of international relationships between
industry, government, and civil society organizations. And, like many
global governance arrangements, they suffer from a “democratic defi-
cit.”15 Viewed from this perspective, common critiques of platform deci-
sion-making are rooted in concerns—familiar to administrative law
scholars—about the quandary of ensuring democratic accountability and
legitimacy when private organizations serve as regulators.16 These con-
cerns are equally reflected in the body of scholarship centered on demo-
cratic accountability for institutions of global governance.17
Recognizing platforms’ important regulatory role suggests its own solu-
tion to the problems of legitimacy and accountability: the application of
administrative law principles and values to hold platforms to account.
Part III explains how principles of transparency, participation, reasoned
decision-making, and judicial review could be deployed to render private
speech governance both legitimate and accountable. What’s more, look-
ing to procedural values like these would help to ensure that all the par-
ties affected by content removal have a voice in the process, and would
avoid fruitless attempts to create substantive rules for resolving a bevy of
online disputes. Examining what it would take to implement these princi-
ples also makes clear that current frameworks governing content deletion
are insufficient because they stymie the ability to achieve any of the four.
In short, the imposition of these standards would benefit all parties—the
public, the government, and the companies themselves.
II. GLOBAL PLATFORM GOVERNANCE—BACKGROUND
A. PRIVATE ORDERING IN THE SHADOW OF THE STATE
In order to understand why platforms’ decisions on individual privacy
and speech rights are increasingly contested, it is helpful to understand
how the framework for online self-governance has shifted over time.
15. Andrew Moravcsik, Is there a ‘Democratic Deficit’ in World Politics? A Framework
for Analysis, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 336, 337 (2004).
16. See, e.g., GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOC-
RACY (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (offering many different explanations of
the accountability problems posed by widespread privatization); Jody Freeman, Private
Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813 (2000);
Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000);
Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003); Paul
Starr, The Meaning of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 6 (1988); Daniel Guttiman,
Public Purpose and Private Service: The Twentieth Century Culture of Contracting Out and
the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 859 (2000); see also Van Loo,
supra note 5.
17. See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability,
in TAMING GLOBALIZATION: FRONTIERS OF GOVERNANCE 130–32 (David Held & Mathias
Koenig-Archibugi eds., 2002); Patrizia Nanz & Jens Steffek, Global Governance, Participa-
tion and the Public Sphere, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 314, 314 (2004); Moravcsik, supra note
15, at 336–37.
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Early Internet thinkers embraced a radically individualistic vision of
cyber self-governance oriented around autonomous communities, free-
dom of movement, and free expression online. While many scholars dis-
missed this view as idealistic or misguided—particularly the belief that
the Internet should exist beyond the reach of national laws—elements of
it persist to this day. In particular, at critical junctures, governments sup-
ported the emergence of online self-governance and self-regulation in the
belief that it would stimulate innovation.18 Those policy choices gave rise
to the framework that governs social media today: ToS, privacy policies,
and “community standards” constitute the most visible rules and regula-
tions governing online speech and privacy.19 Yet private governance of
online speech has not insulated the Internet from pressure by national
governments seeking to regulate. Today, numerous territories lay claim to
the ability to regulate online activity. Increasingly, their weapon of choice
is not the crude cudgel of national regulation, but private ordering itself.
Early Internet acolytes embraced the idea that cyberspace would be a
new “place” or territory, beyond the jurisdiction of any “territorially
based sovereign.”20 In 1996, John Perry Barlow, in a famous articulation
of this principle, rejected the imposition of “legal concepts of property,
expression, identity, movement, and context” on cyberspace as a “hostile
and colonial measure.”21 Barlow’s utopian narrative of Internet excep-
tionalism22 suggested not only that the digital world should not be held to
the same rules that apply to “meatspace”23 or “wetware”24 users, but also
that the Internet would be better regulated by itself than by government,
celebrating “the unwritten codes that already provide our society more
order than could be obtained by any of your impositions.”25
Although Barlow’s quirky narrative was dismissed by some, it also, as
Neil Weinstock Netanel noted, “resounded in thoughtful scholarship.”26
Most significantly, David Post and David R. Johnson had wrestled with
Barlow’s vision and concurred with his assessment that cyberspace posed
18. See, e.g., White House, The Framework for Global Electronic Commerce: Read the
Framework (July 1997), https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/New/Commerce/read
.html [https://perma.cc/3D2X-KGMQ].
19. See Klonick, supra note 14, at 1599.
20. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—the Rise of Law in Cyber-
space, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1375 (1996).
21. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence [https://per
ma.cc/M98D-KBR6].
22. See Eric Goldman, The Third Wave of Internet Exceptionalism, TECH. & MKTG. L.
BLOG (Mar. 11, 2009), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/03/the_third_wave.htm.
23. Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91
CALIF. L. REV. 439, 447 (2003).
24. DIANA SACO, CYBERING DEMOCRACY: PUBLIC SPACE AND THE INTERNET 77
(2002) (“Finally, the concept of wetware, a common hacker slang for human beings . . .
refers to the actual users of cyberspace”) (citation omitted).
25. Barlow, supra note 21 (“Where there are real conflicts, where there are wrongs, we
will identify them and address them by our means. We are forming our own Social Con-
tract. This governance will arise according to the conditions of our world, not yours.”).
26. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Lib-
eral Democratic Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 395, 398 (2000).
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intrinsic challenges to the application of national law, concluding that “no
physical jurisdiction has a more compelling claim than any other to sub-
ject these [online] events exclusively to its laws.”27 Post and Johnson
pointed out that many users would be readily capable of understanding
which online “rules” governed their behavior—whether in the form of
ToS, norms, or guidelines—but unable to determine “which territorial-
based authority might apply its laws to your conduct.”28
In a sense, Barlow’s Internet exceptionalism has not aged particularly
well. As Tim Wu pointed out only a few years later, “[t]he metaphor of
place did not exactly stand the test of time.”29 Dan Hunter described Bar-
low’s rhetoric as “amusing and intentionally overblown.”30 Taken seri-
ously, Hunter pointed out, Barlow and his fellow travelers should be
understood as celebrating the promise of self-regulation as “the only ap-
propriate governance structure” for the Internet.31 Accordingly, alterna-
tive accounts soon emerged to challenge this vision for the online world.
First, scholars took on the general assertion that the legal challenges
posed by “cyberspace” were substantially distinct from those that courts
had been grappling with for years.32 For instance, Jack Goldsmith re-
jected the legal distinctions between cyberspace and real space relied
upon by “regulation skeptics” as overstated or unsupported.33 And Tim
Wu brushed off the “imaginative” suggestions that digital space would
develop its own rules, norms, and institutions that would substitute for
government: “It’s time to move on.”34 Second, Orin Kerr reframed the
rhetoric of “cyberspace as place” as a matter of “perspective,” casting
doubt on claims that the framework was uniquely suited to explain what
made the Internet special.35 In addition, scholars such as Dan Hunter also
pointed out that the reification of the Internet as a distinct “place” had
unwanted effects, resulting in “an undesirable policy outcome: the staking
out of private claims in cyberspace and concomitant reductions in the
public ‘ownership’ of the space.”36 Meanwhile, Julie Cohen observed that
27. Johnson & Post, supra note 20, at 1376.
28. Id. at 1380.
29. Timothy Wu, When Law & the Internet First Met, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 171, 172
(2000).
30. Hunter, supra note 23, at 447.
31. Id.
32. Most famously, Judge Frank Easterbrook denigrated cyberlaw as “just the law of
the horse,” suggesting that lawyers and scholars would do better to “develop a sound
law”—of intellectual property, in this instance—and then apply it to any unique circum-
stances presented in digital space. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the
Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 208 (1996).
33. Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1200–01
(1998).
34. Wu, supra note 29, at 176–77.
35. Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 361–62
(2003).
36. Hunter, supra note 23, at 499; see also Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91
CALIF. L. REV. 521, 529 (2003) (arguing that courts have recognized the differences be-
tween cyber and real space in rejecting the “[r]ote application of personal jurisdiction
rules”).
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all of these theories—whether supportive of or opposed to cyberspace as
its own “place”—failed to account for “both the embodied, situated expe-
rience of cyberspace users and the complex interplay between real and
digital geographies.”37
But while Barlow’s utopian vision of a space beyond the state was criti-
cized and rejected, few American observers challenged the foundational
belief that private ordering, rather than public regulation, should govern
much online activity. Even the most trenchant critics of the view that the
Internet should operate free from terrestrial legal constraints observed
that “private legal ordering” would fill many, albeit not all, legal gaps in
cyberspace.38 Yet there was also substantial uncertainty—rarely articu-
lated in the legal scholarship—about what that private ordering would
consist of. On the one hand, some full-throated arguments in favor of
cyberspace exceptionalism appeared to envision semi-autonomous com-
munities, comprised of individuals, that were largely self-governed by
consensus.39 Although these arguments had different emphases—some-
times, for example, stressing the Internet’s potential as a site of direct
democracy, and sometimes stressing individual freedom and choice40—
they were based on a fundamentally common premise that each commu-
nity would control the formulation of its own rules and norms, leading to
substantial diversity in approaches across the Internet. Moreover, that vi-
sion of community control was a democratic one. Post and Johnson sug-
gested that, while system operators were capable of unilaterally
exercising the power of “banishment” to enforce online rules and norms,
online communities increasingly had started “explicitly to recognize that
formulating and enforcing such rules should be a matter for principled
discussion, not an act of will by whoever has control of the power
switch.”41 As Anne Wells Branscomb noted in 1995, in some online con-
texts, “[the] law of the wild reigns, with each individual sysop [system
operator] acting as the Lord Chancellor and High Executioner;” but in
other “communities,” rules and regulations were made and enforced,
often with clarity and purpose.42
Far from being outright rejected, elements of this highly individualistic
vision for online self-governance not only became reality, but were em-
braced by governments. In 1997, the Clinton Administration explicitly ap-
37. Julie Cohen, Cyberspace As/And Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 213 (2007).
38. Goldsmith, supra note 33, at 1215–16 (“Private legal ordering thus has the poten-
tial to resolve many, but not all, of the challenges posed by multijurisdictional cyberspace
activity.”).
39. Johnson & Post, supra note 20, at 1393 (“If the sysops and users who collectively
inhabit and control a particular area of the Net want to establish special rules to govern
conduct there, and if that rule set does not fundamentally impinge upon the vital interests
of others who never visit this new space, then the law of sovereigns in the physical world
should defer to this new form of self-government.”).
40. See Netanel, supra note 26, at 404 (describing “cyberpopulist,” “cybersyndicalist,”
and “cyberanarchist” arguments in favor of online self-governance).
41. Johnson & Post, supra note 20, at 1388.
42. Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to
the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1668–69 (1995).
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plauded self-regulation as the primary mechanism for regulating the
Internet in its “Framework for Global Electronic Commerce,” writing
that, as a matter of policy, “governments should encourage industry self-
regulation wherever appropriate and support the efforts of private sector
organizations to develop mechanisms to facilitate the successful opera-
tion of the Internet. Even where collective agreements or standards are
necessary, private entities should, where possible, take the lead in or-
ganizing them.”43 In the interest of promoting innovation, governments
also opted to create immunity provisions shielding platforms from civil or
criminal liability for content posted by others—and permitting companies
to make their own rules to govern which speakers and what content
would be allowed on their platforms.
Intermediary protections from liability for content posted by others be-
came prevalent across the globe.44 In the United States, § 230 of the
Communications Decency Act cemented this approach by immunizing
platforms and hosts from liability for information posted by third parties
and protecting their efforts to block or filter “offensive” material from
their services.45 Even the European Union, which initially appeared to
support strong regulation of the Internet, turned toward self-regulation in
the late 1990s,46 and toward “co-regulation” thereafter.47 Europe also
embraced the need to “promote international standards” to protect in-
termediaries “from the obligation of blocking Internet content without
prior due process.”48 Under the European Commission’s E-Commerce
Directive, intermediary service providers were shielded from liability in
Member States if they lacked “actual knowledge of illegal activity or in-
formation,” or “act[ ] expeditiously to remove or to disable access” once
they gain knowledge.49 The E-Commerce Directive likewise bars Mem-
ber States from imposing general obligations on intermediaries “to moni-
tor the information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation
actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.”50 In ad-
dition, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights places
43. White House, supra note 18.
44. See About the World Intermediary Liability Map, STAN. CTR. FOR INTERNET &
SOC’Y, http://wilmap.law.stanford.edu/about [https://perma.cc/XMG8-J328] (last visited
Feb. 2, 2019).
45. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012); see also Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that web site was not
immune under § 230 where its connection to illegal content was “direct and palpable”);
Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666,
670 (7th Cir. 2008); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
46. Matthew J. Feeley, EU Internet Regulation Policy: The Rise of Self-Regulation, 22
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 159, 168 (1999).
47. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER T. MARSDEN, INTERNET CO-REGULATION: EUROPEAN
LAW, REGULATORY GOVERNANCE AND LEGITIMACY IN CYBERSPACE (2011).
48. Council of the European Union, EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Ex-
pression Online and Offline, ¶ 34 (May 12, 2014) [hereinafter EU Human Rights Guide-
lines], https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_human_rights_guidelines_on_freedom_of_
expression_online_and_offline_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DC6-QCK6].
49. Council Directive 2000/31, art. 14, 2000 O.J. (L 178) (EC).
50. Id. art. 15.
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some limits on third-party liability for user-generated online content.51
Although online self-regulation and self-governance carried the day,
however, their current form looks distinct from John Perry Barlow’s orig-
inal vision for cyberspace autonomy. The forms of online rules and regu-
lations that are most visible to the Internet-using public—ToS, privacy
policies, and “community standards,” particularly on social media—
scarcely resemble a set of rules and norms that were negotiated and
agreed upon through direct democratic participation and a user-gener-
ated process. While companies may occasionally solicit public feedback
on draft policy changes, doing so is more of a publicity stunt than a nego-
tiation tactic; online platforms need not take user criticisms into
account.52
In other words, the world of online “self-governance” in 2018 is neither
the libertarian utopia envisioned by Barlow nor the anarchist dystopia
envisioned by critics. The Internet is not a space apart, but rather one
closely governed by corporate entities. At the same time, Barlow was not
wrong to anticipate that the most important governors online would not
be “territorial sovereigns.”53 But although states have taken a back seat
to private enterprise in regulating online speech and privacy, the Internet
hardly resembles Barlow’s “world where anyone, anywhere may express
his or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced
into silence or conformity.”54 Rather, online life is continually—and in-
creasingly aggressively—governed by rules made and enforced by corpo-
rate entities like Google, Facebook, and Twitter.55
In a sense, this development is not a departure from Barlow’s vision,
but its logical conclusion. Because the ethos of cyberspace exceptionalism
was, at its core, neoliberal and market-driven,56 it should come as no sur-
prise that some platforms have gained increasing market dominance and
concomitant control. Yet this asymmetric relationship between consum-
ers and corporate platforms is a far cry from a universe in which an online
community would agree upon collective norms, and a system operator—
accountable to that community—would enforce them.
51. MTE v. Hungary, App. No. 22947/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016) (finding that Article 10
of the ECHR limits third-party liability for online content). But see Delfi AS v. Estonia,
App. No. 64569/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015) (finding that imposition of liability for unlawful
online hate speech does not offend Article 10).
52. See Josh Constine, Facebook rewrites Terms of Service, clarifying device data col-
lection, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 4, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/04/facebook-terms-
of-service/; Lizzie O’Shea, Time to cut ties with the digital oligarchs and rewire the web,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/20/digit
al-oligarchs-rewire-web-facebook-scandal; Margot E. Kaminski & Kate Klonick, Face-
book, Free Expression and the Power of a Leak, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2017), https://www
.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/opinion/facebook-first-amendment-leaks-free-speech.html.
53. See Johnson & Post, supra note 20, at 1392.
54. Barlow, supra note 21.
55. See, e.g., Klonick, supra note 14, at 1601–03.
56. See Netanel, supra note 26, at 410 (“[F]or the most part, the cyberian project is a
neoliberal one. They view liberal democracy as a second-best alternative to private
agreement.”).
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But perhaps the most significant error the cyber-exceptionalists made
was in thinking that private ordering would resolve issues of legitimacy
and accountability for online governance. As the early cyberlaw scholars
recognized, the Internet’s global reach heightens substantive disagree-
ments among nations about the scope of speech, privacy, and property
protections. In suggesting that the Internet would be a new “place” or
territory, beyond the jurisdiction of any “territorially based sovereign,”57
cyber-exceptionalists predicted that the Internet could escape these dis-
agreements by permitting online communities to create rules and norms
to govern themselves.
This prediction could not have been more wrong. To the contrary, the
development of the platform ecosystem has replicated jurisdictional con-
flict through the lens of private ordering.58 Internet self-governance re-
sulted in the privatization of surveillance and speech regulation and the
emergence of “new-school” methods of speech regulation.59 As Jack
Balkin has demonstrated, the growth of platforms’ own power to control
speech and privacy has rendered them vulnerable to state control and
pressure through a new set of techniques: “collateral censorship,” “pub-
lic-private cooperation and cooptation,” and “digital prior restraint.”60
Moreover, the companies that have gained competitive control of the “in-
frastructure of free expression” provide only weak protections when a
government “uses that infrastructure, or its limitations, as leverage for
regulation or surveillance.”61 These features do not insulate the Internet
from global pressure, but rather make it more vulnerable.
Indeed, platforms’ weaknesses are compounded when multiple na-
tional governments pressure them to adopt new policy changes that are
often in conflict with other national policies. Although some have sug-
gested that online intermediaries are increasingly resistant to government
pressures to assist in surveillance,62 the evidence demonstrates that plat-
forms are also increasingly willing to modulate their own rules on online
speech and privacy to better fit a range of government demands. At the
same time, governments seeking to control online speech are increasingly
leveraging the infrastructure of private ordering itself—in particular,
through “voluntary” agreements among enterprise and through the appli-
cation and enforcement of ToS—to achieve global effects for their policy
preferences.
57. Johnson & Post, supra note 20, at 1375.
58. See Daskal, supra note 13, at 219.
59. Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV.
2296, 2298–99 (2014).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2303.
62. Chapter One: Cooperation or Resistance?: The Role of Tech Companies in Govern-
ment Surveillance, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1722, 1727 (2018) (pointing to an uptick in “interme-
diary-initiated litigation”) [hereinafter Cooperation or Resistance?].
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B. PRIVATE ORDERING AND ONLINE SPEECH:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
As a general matter, efforts to enlist intermediaries to curb unwanted
speech on a global basis are nothing new, although they are constantly
evolving. Rightsholders have enlisted a variety of online intermediaries in
efforts to apply U.S. intellectual property laws on a global scale. Section
512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA) provides
online service providers with statutory immunity from secondary liability
when infringing material is transmitted through their platforms.63 In or-
der to maintain their immunity under § 512’s safe harbor, service provid-
ers implement “notice and takedown” procedures: a rightsholder can
alert an online service provider of allegedly infringing content. The inter-
mediary will typically remove that content and notify the alleged in-
fringer, who can file a “counter notice” challenging the removal.64
The DMCA is a domestic law, but platforms’ notice and takedown pro-
cedures give it global effect: when an intermediary deletes content under
the DMCA, it typically does so across the entire platform.65 This practice,
which has largely gone unstudied, raises a number of jurisdictional and
choice of law issues. As Alex Feerst, head of legal at Medium, has
pointed out, the legal status of DMCA takedown requests originating
from rightsholders outside of the United States is particularly unclear.66
Moreover, some platforms have resisted demands to take down infringing
content when compelled to do so by foreign courts.67 Global deletion
only compounds the significant problems with notice-and-takedown iden-
tified by several scholars, who have argued that the DMCA framework
leads to over-deletion of lawful content. For instance, a recent quantita-
tive analysis of a random sample of over 1,800 takedown requests found a
significant number of requests either incorrectly identified or insuffi-
ciently specified the allegedly infringing work.68
63. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
64. See Jennifer M. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown: Online Service Provider and
Rightsholder Accounts of Everyday Practice, 64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 371, 373 (2017).
65. Annemarie Bridy, Intellectual Property, in LAW, BORDERS, AND SPEECH: PRO-
CEEDINGS AND MATERIALS, STAN. CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y 13 (Daphne Keller ed.,
2017), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/publications/proceedings-volume [https://perma.cc/
SP9A-NE7Y] (“Has notice and takedown for copyright become de facto harmonized
through platforms’ global application of the DMCA?”).
66. Id. (“Do such notices effectively signal acceptance of US legal jurisdiction over the
dispute, and potentially even waiver of remedies under other countries’ laws? Must right
holders assert only copyright claims that are valid under US law, or can they use the
DMCA to assert claims under the law of the sender’s country?”).
67. See, e.g., Equustek Sols. Inc. v. Jack, 2014 BCSC 1063, 63 B.C.L.R. 5th 145 (Can.
B.C. S.C.) (issuing injunction compelling Google to remove links to hardware distributor
that had infringed plaintiff’s trademark on a global basis).
68. Jennifer M. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice 2 (U.C.
Berkeley, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research, Paper No. 2755628, 2017); see also Daphne
Keller, Empirical Evidence of “Over-Removal” by Internet Companies Under Intermediary
Liability Laws, STAN. CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Oct. 12, 2015, 8:23 AM), http://
cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/10/empirical-evidence-over-removal-internet-companies-
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Copyright is far from the only context, however, in which the law cre-
ates incentives for intermediaries to participate in private online govern-
ance that reaches across national borders. For instance, Annemarie Bridy
has demonstrated that some stakeholders are increasingly seeking to
broaden the role of ICANN—the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers—in resolving disputes about online content.69
ICANN, which is an independent corporation responsible for administer-
ing the Domain Name System (DNS),70 has long been involved in resolv-
ing conflicts that concerned “cybersquatting”—bad-faith use of another’s
trademark in a domain name. Rather than adjudicating these disputes
itself, ICANN adopted the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy (UDRP), an “ICANN-administered alternative dispute resolution
system in which ICANN-accredited arbitrators decide disputes via a
streamlined, web-enabled process.”71 The UDRP was mandatory for ad-
judication of registrars’ and registrants’ cybersquatting disputes.
The UDRP was never intended to adjudicate disputes about whether
site content infringed intellectual property rights. Indeed, that appeared
to be far beyond ICANN’s purview.72 However, Bridy documents how
rightsholders and registry operators are entering into private, voluntary
arrangements to facilitate the worldwide blocking of entire domains on
which infringing content is hosted. In 2016, the Motion Picture Associa-
tion of America (MPAA)—one of the biggest organizations representing
rightsholders—entered into a voluntary “trusted notifier” arrangement
with Donuts, a major registry operator that controls domains such as
.MOVIE, .THEATER and .COMPANY.73 Under the arrangement,
MPAA can directly refer complaints of “pervasive copyright infringe-
ment” on websites to Donuts, which can then work with registrars to de-
termine whether the websites violate Donuts’ ToS.74
under-intermediary-liability-laws [https://perma.cc/383C-6VAH] (summarizing several
studies).
69. Annemarie Bridy, Notice and Takedown in the Domain Name System: ICANN’s
Ambivalent Drift into Online Content Regulation, 74 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1345, 1347
(2017).
70. About ICANN, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/welcome-2012-02-
25-en [https://perma.cc/5838-T9KR] (last visited Feb. 9, 2019).
71. Bridy, supra note 69, at 1356.
72. See, e.g., David Post, ICANN, copyright infringement, and “the public interest”,
WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2015/03/09/icann-copyright-infringement-and-the-public-interest/?utm_term=.994762d0df
be [https://perma.cc/85QE-8T8H] (“Who authorized them to do that? What does that have
to do with ICANN’s fundamental mission (as stated in its own Charter): to ‘coordinate . . .
the global Internet’s system of unique identifiers . . . to ensure the stable and secure opera-
tion’ of that system?”).
73. One Year Later: Trusted Notifier Program Proves Effective, MOTION PICTURE
ASS’N AM. (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.mpaa.org/press/one-year-later-trusted-notifier-pro
gram-proves-effective/ [https://perma.cc/K4ZR-ZRLB].
74. Donuts and the MPAA Establish New Partnership to Reduce Online Piracy, MO-
TION PICTURE ASS’N AM. (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.mpaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/
02/Donuts-and-MPAA-Establish-New-Partnership-2.9.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/5REX-
DRGJ]. The MPAA has a similar partnership with Radix, a Dubai-based registry operator.
See Radix and the MPAA Establish New Partnership to Reduce Online Piracy, MOTION
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The MPAA’s position is that voluntary cooperative measures to curb
clearly illegal copyright infringement raise no concerns about chilling per-
missible speech.75 But as Bridy points out, voluntary enforcement ar-
rangements between rights holders and registries simply aggravate the
accountability and transparency issues presented by the UDRP and other
alternative dispute resolution methods.76 When adjudication occurs in
private, it raises questions about transparency, accountability, and the
quality of decision making, none of which are visible to the public.77
While the UDRP at least publishes its opinions,78 the same cannot be said
of many other ADR methods, in which neither the proceedings nor the
outcomes are public.79 As Bridy points out, rightsholders and registry op-
erators might find private governance valuable and efficient because it
allows them to avoid “[t]horny questions of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and
choice of law.”80
III. GLOBAL PLATFORM GOVERNANCE—
TWO STORIES FROM EUROPE
In some contexts, too, private governance allows decision-making to
occur out of the public eye—an outcome that might be particularly desir-
able in politically charged contexts. These features are not unique to the
context of intellectual property. Indeed, new efforts to police and remove
PICTURE ASS’N AM. (May 13, 2016), https://www.mpaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/
Radix-and-the-MPAA-Establish-New-Partnership-to-Reduce-Online-Piracy.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8S8B-VYQP].
75. One Year Later: Trusted Notifier Program Proves Effective, supra note 73
(“Speech interests are not implicated nor ‘content regulation’ concerns triggered by coop-
erative efforts geared against wholesale piracy.”).
76. Bridy, supra note 69, at 1359 (“Empirical study of the quality of UDRP decision-
making is hampered by the fact that opinions alone are published without any of the par-
ties’ submissions. Lack of access to a full, public record makes it impossible to evaluate the
provider’s reasoning in light of the facts and competing arguments presented to it.”).
77. See, e.g., ADR Advantages, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/amc/
en/center/advantages.html [https://perma.cc/94Y4-XJKJ] (last visited Feb. 9, 2019) (“ADR
proceedings are private.”); Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem For and
Celebration of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1821
(2014) (“[T]he promise of confidentiality is a linchpin of ADR’s appeal, and the rules of
the leading purveyors of ADR require it.”).
78. Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN (Sept. 28,
2013), https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/udrp-rules-2015-03-11-en [https://perma.cc/
7J9R-QFTM] (“Except if the Panel determines otherwise (see Paragraph 4(j) of the Pol-
icy), the Provider shall publish the full decision and the date of its implementation on a
publicly accessible web site. In any event, the portion of any decision determining a com-
plaint to have been brought in bad faith (see Paragraph 15(e) of these Rules) shall be
published.”).
79. Phillip Landolt & Alejandro Garcı´a, Commentary on WIPO Arbitration Rules,
WIPO ARB. & MEDIATION CTR. (2017), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/amc/en/
docs/2017commentrulesarb.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NXD-7F3R] (“Unique amongst the
leading institutional rules, Article 75 of the WIPO provides that the parties to a WIPO
arbitration are not able to disclose to third parties the existence of the arbitration. This
obligation logically encompasses more specific information about the arbitration, for ex-
ample, the cause of action, remedies sought, IP Rights in issue (where applicable) and the
composition of the arbitral Tribunal.”).
80. Bridy, supra note 69, at 1376.
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illegal content online double down on trends toward private governance
of online content, drawing on the same kinds of voluntary, cooperative
arrangements and notice-and-takedown procedures. The result is that
governments are increasingly able to leverage platforms’ own procedures
to make global policy—without public accountability.
A. HATE SPEECH, TERRORIST SPEECH, AND THE HASH DATABASE
Rising pressures on platforms to assist in monitoring and deleting ille-
gal hate speech vividly illustrate the increasingly entwined, and often
fraught, interests of states and platforms. Despite Europe’s historically
strong intermediary protections,81 in recent years, both Member States
and the European Commission have moved toward imposing additional
obligations—through mechanisms both soft and hard—for intermediaries
to monitor their own platforms and to delete illegal hate speech and ter-
rorist speech. Over time, intermediaries’ obligations have shifted and be-
come less clear, partly because platforms have participated in voluntary
self-regulatory and co-regulatory initiatives, through which they increas-
ingly instantiate state speech preferences through private ordering.82
The European Union’s initial effort to address online hate speech, the
2008 Framework Decision on combating certain forms and expressions of
racism, was directed at Member States, not online service providers.
Under the Framework Decision, Member States were bound to criminal-
ize certain “expressions of racism and xenophobia.”83 These included
“publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed against a group of per-
sons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour,
religion, descent or national or ethnic origin,” or “publicly condoning,
denying or grossly trivialising crimes of genocide, crimes against human-
ity and war crimes . . . when the conduct is carried out in a manner likely
to incite to violence or hatred against such a group or a member of such a
group.”84
In May 2014, the Council of the European Union adopted the EU
Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Of-
fline.85 Broadly speaking, the guidelines recognized the import of online
communications for the freedoms of opinion, expression, and privacy
protected in human rights instruments, noting that “[a]ll human rights
that exist offline must also be protected online.”86 In invoking the lan-
guage of human rights, the EU also gestured to the UN Guiding Princi-
81. See Daphne Keller, The Right Tools: Europe’s Intermediary Liability Laws and the
EU 2016 General Data Protection Regulation, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 289, 295, 305–06
(2018) [hereinafter Keller, The Right Tools].
82. See Citron, supra note 3, at 1047 (“No matter how often EU lawmakers describe
the recent changes to private speech practices as ‘voluntary’ decisions, they can only be
reasonably understood as the product of government coercion.”).
83. Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008, 2008 O.J. (L
328) 55, 55.
84. Id. at 55–56.
85. EU Human Rights Guidelines, supra note 48.
86. Id. ¶ 6.
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ples on Business and Human Rights, recognizing that although human
rights law binds only states, corporations too may have obligations to re-
spect human rights.87 The EU vowed to “promote” corporate responsibil-
ity for human rights violations online, but also recognized “the need to
promote international standards, including standards protecting in-
termediaries from the obligation of blocking Internet content without
prior due process.”88
In adopting the guidelines, the EU highlighted the importance of pro-
cedural safeguards, noting that legislation constraining expressive rights
“must be applied by a body which is independent of any political, com-
mercial or other unwarranted influence in a manner that is neither arbi-
trary nor discriminatory, and with adequate safeguards against abuse,
including the possibility of challenge and remedy against its abusive ap-
plication.”89 Finally, the guidelines recognized the difficult balance be-
tween regulating unlawful speech and freedom of expression, noting that
“[h]ate speech legislation should not be abused by governments to dis-
courage citizens from engaging in legitimate democratic debate on mat-
ters of general interest.”90
In 2015, France saw a slew of attacks. In January, the Kouachi brothers
carried out a mass shooting at the offices of Charlie Hebdo, a satirical
magazine. Days later, an associate carried out a second attack at a kosher
supermarket in Paris. Then, in November, coordinated attacks across
Paris—including at the Bataclan, a soccer stadium, and restaurants—
killed 130 people and wounded hundreds more.91 In the wake of the at-
tacks in Paris and Brussels, European governments became increasingly
vigilant about domestic threats. Europol, the European Union’s law en-
forcement agency, pointed in part to social media, writing that terrorists
relied on the Internet and social media for “dissemination of propaganda
material but also for recruitment and fundraising,” and that they had
“adapt[ed] to efforts made by social media platforms and authorities to
contain their online activities.”92
Since 2015, European states and regional actors have taken a number
of approaches to remediating hateful and violent speech online. First,
platforms have engaged in partnerships with government entities to find a
resolution to the problem of harmful online speech. In December 2015,
87. U.N. Office of the High Comm’r, Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, 13, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publica
tions/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/H24P-MZ2P] (Principle 11:
“Business enterprises should respect human rights. This means that they should avoid in-
fringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts
with which they are involved.”).
88. EU Human Rights Guidelines, supra note 48, ¶ 34.
89. Id. ¶ 22.
90. Id. annex I.
91. EUROPOL, EUROPEAN UNION TERRORISM SITUATION AND TREND REPORT 22
(2016), https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/europol_tesat_2016
.pdf [https://perma.cc/DSZ6-UAPR].
92. Id. at 16.
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the European Commission launched the EU Internet Forum, a multi-
stakeholder forum intended “to reach a joint, voluntary approach based
on a public-private partnership to detect and address harmful material
online.”93 Ve?ra Jourova´, Commissioner for Justice, Consumer and Gen-
der Equality, said: “Freedom of speech is a human right, but this right
does not protect illegal hate speech inciting violence and hatred.”94 The
forum included high-level representatives from Facebook, Microsoft,
Twitter, and YouTube, as well as Europe, the interior ministers of several
EU Member States, and representatives of the European Parliament.
Following the launch of the forum, in May 2016, Facebook, Microsoft,
Twitter, and YouTube agreed to adhere to a voluntary “Code of Con-
duct” negotiated with the European Commission, under which the com-
panies agreed to expedite the review of notifications to remove hate
speech and implement new rules, community guidelines, and processes to
bar hate speech from their platforms.95 The Code of Conduct required
the companies to establish “clear and effective processes” for reviewing
removal requests, to “prohibit the promotion of incitement to violence
and hateful conduct” on their platforms, and to review the removal de-
mands against both their own internal rules as well as national laws.96
The companies also agreed to partner with “trusted reporters” or
“trusted flaggers” who would notify platforms of the existence of content
that violated their ToS.97 The Code of Conduct envisioned that the
trusted reporters would include non-government civil society organiza-
tions,98 and that platforms would “review the majority of valid notifica-
tions for removal of illegal hate speech in less than 24 hours and remove
or disable access to such content, if necessary.”99 Some platforms have
also given trusted flagger status to specialized law enforcement depart-
ments, known as “internet referral units,” that monitor the web for illicit
material, including terrorist content.100 Two civil society partners with-
drew from the Forum in protest, writing that the process of using ToS to
delete content—rather than legal demands from law enforcement—was
“established outside an accountable democratic framework” and “ex-
93. European Commission Press Release IP/15/6243, EU Internet Forum: Bringing
Together Governments, Europol and Technology Companies to Counter Terrorist Content
and Hate Speech Online (Dec. 3, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6243_
en.htm [https://perma.cc/4BDD-GW3C].
94. Id.
95. Code of Conduct, supra note 10.
96. Id.
97. European Commission Press Release IP/16/1937, European Commission and IT
Companies announce Code of Conduct on illegal online hate speech (May 31, 2016), http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1937_en.htm [https://perma.cc/FAW5-YKRR].
98. Code of Conduct, supra note 10.
99. Id.
100. See Brian Chang, From Internet Referral Units to International Agreements: Cen-
sorship of the Internet by the UK and EU, 49 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 114, 120–22
(2018) (“[S]ome ICT companies, such as Google and YouTube, give IRUs a ‘trusted flag-
ger’ status.”).
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ploits unclear liability rules for companies.”101
Platforms have also taken a voluntary approach to harmful online con-
tent. In December 2016, several companies announced that they had
“commit[ed] to the creation of a shared industry database of ‘hashes’ —
unique digital ‘fingerprints’ — for violent terrorist imagery or terrorist
recruitment videos or images that we have removed from our ser-
vices.”102 Hash sharing is not entirely new—a similar collaborative ar-
rangement began in 2012 to “improve and accelerate the identification,
removal and reporting of child abuse images across different digital net-
works.”103 By December 2017, a year later, the terrorism hash database
included more than 40,000 hashes, according to The Guardian.104
In March 2017, the European Union enacted the Terrorism Directive,
which broadened the list of terrorism offenses to include
the distribution, or otherwise making available by any means,
whether online or offline, of a message to the public, with the intent
to incite the commission of [a terrorist offense], where such conduct,
directly or indirectly, such as by the glorification of terrorist acts,
advocates the commission of terrorist offences, thereby causing a
danger that one or more such offences may be committed.105
The Terrorism Directive recognized that “[a]n effective means of combat-
ing terrorism on the internet is to remove online content constituting a
public provocation to commit a terrorist offence at its source,” and enu-
merated a number of options for doing so: legislative, non-legislative, and
judicial.106 However, the directive also appeared to preserve the shield
against intermediary liability in the e-commerce directive, providing that
“no general obligation should be imposed on service providers to monitor
the information which they transmit or store, nor to actively seek out
facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.”107
101. EDRi and Access Now withdraw from the EU Commission IT Forum discussions,
EUROPEAN DIGITAL RIGHTS INITIATIVE (May 31, 2016), https://edri.org/edri-access-now-
withdraw-eu-commission-forum-discussions/.
102. Partnering to help curb the spread of terrorist content online, GOOGLE (Dec. 5,
2016), https://blog.google/topics/google-europe/partnering-help-curb-spread-terrorist-con
tent-online/ [https://perma.cc/G574-DJGM].
103. Sharing hashes across industry, THORN, https://www.thorn.org/reporting-child-sexu
al-abuse-content-shared-hash/ [https://perma.cc/QM4D-3R9J] (last visited Feb. 9, 2019);
see also Tomas Rudl, EU-Kommission: Immer mehr Plattformen sollen Uploads filtern,
NETZPOLITIK (Feb. 23, 2018), https://netzpolitik.org/2018/eu-kommission-immer-mehr-
plattformen-sollen-uploads-filtern/ [https://perma.cc/LL8V-3D79] (“Andererseits ha¨lt sie
immer mehr Plattformen dazu an, sich an der Datenbank zu beteiligen, in der die digitalen
Fingerabdru¨cke der inkriminierten Inhalte abgelegt sind. Landet ein solcher „Hash”
einmal in der Datenbank, ist ein erneutes Hochladen der jeweiligen Datei nicht mehr
mo¨glich.”).
104. Samuel Gibbs, EU warns tech firms: remove extremist content faster or be regulated,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/dec/07/eu-warns-
tech-firms-facebook-google-youtube-twitter-remove-extremist-content-regulated-europe
an-commission [https://perma.cc/L5VY-ZUCB].
105. Council Directive (EU) 2017/541, art. 5, 2017 O.J. (L 88) 6, 14.
106. Id. pmbl., ¶ 22.
107. Id. ¶ 23. (“ Furthermore, hosting service providers should not be held liable as
long as they do not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and are not
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Throughout 2017, the “voluntary” cooperation arrangements between
government and industry took on a harder edge as governments called on
industry to develop new tools to stamp out illegal content faster and more
accurately. In June 2017, the European Council adopted a conclusion that
“[i]ndustry has its own responsibility to help combat terrorism and crime
online.”108 The Council wrote that it expected industry “to develop new
technology and tools to improve the automatic detection and removal of
content that incites to terrorist acts.”109 The G7 had likewise called on
online platforms “to act urgently in developing and sharing new technol-
ogy and tools to improve the automatic detection of content promoting
incitement to violence.”110
The threat of legislation was not far behind.111 In September 2017, the
European Commission issued a communication entitled “Tackling Illegal
Content Online: Towards an enhanced responsibility of online plat-
forms.”112 As one commentator noted, “the thrust of the Communication
is apparent from its sub-title.”113 The central new development of the
communication, however, is that the Commission encouraged platforms
to “adopt effective proactive measures to detect and remove illegal con-
tent online and not only limit themselves to reacting to notices which they
receive.”114 The communication also encouraged platforms to rely on
“trusted flaggers, . . . specialised entities with specific expertise in identi-
fying illegal content, and dedicated structures for detecting and identify-
ing such content online.”115 Trusted flaggers, according to the
communication, should be “expected to bring their expertise and work
with high quality standards, which should result in higher quality notices
and faster take-downs.”116
By December 2017, when the third “ministerial meeting” of the forum
took place, industry representatives had expanded considerably:
Justpaste.it, Snap, Wordpress, and Yellow all joined the forum meeting.
aware of the facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is
apparent.”).




110. G7 Taormina Statement on the Fight Against Terrorism and Violent Extremism, G7
(May 26, 2017), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/05/26/state
ment-fight-against-terrorism/ [https://perma.cc/TE3W-NLVH].
111. Presidency Conclusions, supra note 108 (“This should be complemented by the
relevant legislative measures at EU level, if necessary.”).
112. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Tackling
Illegal Content Online: Towards an enhanced responsibility of online platforms, at 1, COM
(2017) 555 final (Sept. 28, 2017) [hereinafter Communication], https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52017DC0555 [https://perma.cc/96FK-C8F6].
113. Nick Aries, Is Europe really moving away from protecting Online platforms,
IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 11, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/10/11/europe-moving-
away-protecting-online-platforms/id=88737/.
114. Communication, supra note 112, at 10 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 8.
116. Id.
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The Facebook representative spoke in support of automated means of
deleting content, writing that “[t]oday, 99% of the ISIS and Al Qaeda-
related terror content we remove from Facebook is content we detect
before anyone in our community has flagged it to us, and in some cases,
before it goes live on the site.”117 But European Commission representa-
tives suggested that “our favoured cooperative approach with the indus-
try” may not go “far enough and fast enough,” and that legislation might
be necessary.118
In March 2018, the European Commission released a recommendation
on “measures to effectively tackle illegal content online.”119 The recom-
mendation called on platforms to provide “fast-track procedures” to take
down content referred by “competent authorities,” “internet referral
units,” and “trusted flaggers,” whether the content was illegal or was a
violation of the platform’s ToS.120 The Commission also called on plat-
forms to take “proportionate and specific proactive measures, including
by using automated means,” to find, remove, and prevent the reposting of
terrorist content.121 Finally, the recommendation called on government
institutions to “encourage” platforms to “cooperate” in sharing techno-
logical tools to curb terrorist content.122
In the summer of 2018, the Commission announced that it would take
“stronger action” by drafting a new regulation on preventing the dissemi-
nation of terrorist content online.123 The Commission intended the draft
regulation, released in September 2018, to strike an appropriate, “propor-
tional” balance with respect to fundamental rights of free expression.124
Nonetheless, the draft regulation adopts a relatively broad definition of
“terrorist content,” including not only direct incitement but also “glorify-
ing” terrorist crimes or “promoting the activities” of terrorist groups.125
The draft regulation also imposes a variety of new obligations on plat-
forms that may raise concerns about accountability. As an initial matter,
the regulation requires platforms to remove or disable access to “terrorist
content” within one hour.126 Although the one-hour rule has gained sig-
117. European Commission Press Release IP/17/5105, Fighting Terrorism Online: In-
ternet Forum pushes for automatic detection of terrorist propaganda (Dec. 6, 2017) (state-
ment of Monika Bickert, Director of Global Policy Management, Facebook), http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5105_en.htm [https://perma.cc/3GFB-G4CE].
118. Id. (statement of Julian King, Comm’r for the Security Union).
119. Commission Recommendation on Measures to Effectively Tackle Illegal Content
Online, at ¶ 1, COM (2018) 1177 final (Mar. 1, 2018).
120. Id. at ¶¶ 23, 25, 32.
121. Id. at ¶¶ 36–37.
122. Id. at ¶ 38.
123. Social media faces EU fine if terror lingers for an hour, BBC (Aug. 20, 2018), https:/
/www.bbc.com/news/technology-45247169 [https://perma.cc/7QXF-SD4F].
124. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Preventing the Dissemination of Terrorist Content Online, COM (2018) 640 final (Sept. 12,
2018) [hereinafter Draft Terrorism Regulation], https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/soteu2018-preventing-terrorist-content-online-regulation-640_en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JW9W-XRLH].
125. Id. art. 2.
126. Id. art. 4.
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nificant media attention, other provisions are equally significant.127 Arti-
cle 6 of the draft regulation requires service providers to “take proactive
measures” to prevent the dissemination of terrorist content.128 These
measures may include automated removal of content, automated preven-
tion of re-uploading, or “detecting, identifying and expeditiously remov-
ing” new terrorist content.129 If a “competent authority” of a member
state finds that the platform’s proactive measures do not suffice, it may
impose “specific additional necessary and proportionate proactive mea-
sures” upon the platform.130 The draft regulation instructs that these
measures should account for the “economic capacity” of the platform and
the effects of the measures on free expression and the free flow of infor-
mation.131 Nonetheless, it provides no information about how this bal-
ance ought to be struck. Moreover, the draft regulation provides no
mechanism for platforms to appeal decisions that would require them to
adopt new technological means of deleting or preventing the publication
of speech.
In defense of the draft regulation, Julian King, the EU Security Com-
missioner, has observed that “[e]very attack over the last 18 months or
two years or so has got an online dimension. Either inciting or in some
cases instructing, providing instruction, or glorifying.”132 At least in the-
ory, the information targeted by the draft regulation is equally illegal of-
fline as it is online.133
At the same time, the draft regulation makes a sincere effort to bring
accountability and transparency to platforms’ practices. For example, rec-
ognizing that automated removal might present serious risks to free ex-
pression, the draft regulation also requires that platforms provide
“effective and appropriate safeguards”—including “human oversight and
verifications where appropriate”—to ensure that automated takedowns
are “well-founded.”134 Article 8 requires platforms to publish trans-
parency reports that include information about their measures to take
down and prevent the re-upload of terrorist content.135 The regulation
also requires platforms to notify individuals whose content is deleted and
to create “effective and accessible” complaint mechanisms so that users
127. See, e.g., Natasha Lomas, Europe to push for one-hour takedown law for terrorist
content, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 12, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/09/12/europe-to-push-
for-one-hour-takedown-law-for-terrorist-content/ [https://perma.cc/UAD4-8MVP]; Daniel
Boffey, Remove terror content or be fined millions, EU tells social media firms, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/sep/13/social-media-firms-could-
face-huge-fines-over-terrorist-content [https://perma.cc/2SQY-VZT2].




132. Boffey, supra note 127.
133. See Patrick Smyth, Crackdown on online terror content not censorship, says EU,
IRISH TIMES (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/crackdown-
on-online-terror-content-not-censorship-says-eu-1.3628352 [https://perma.cc/J2TA-WNSF].
134. Draft Terrorism Regulation, supra note 124, art. 9 (emphasis added).
135. Id. art. 8.
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may appeal those decisions.136
While the Commission has taken an aggressive tack, the Council of
Europe (CoE)—the international organization dedicated to promoting
and protecting human rights in Europe—has been more moderate in its
outlook. In 2008, the CoE issued the Human Rights guidelines for In-
ternet service providers, in which the CoE recognized that platforms’ ad-
judication “decisions and actions with regard to the accessibility of
services” affected human rights and expressive freedoms.137 The CoE
guidelines instructed platforms that they should filter, block, or delete
content “only after a verification of the illegality of the content;” deleting
content without cause could violate rights of free expression and access to
information.
The forum and the hash sharing arrangement reflect several strains in
apparently voluntary efforts to curb hateful and violent content online.
First, each reflects extensive cooperation among industry, civil society or-
ganizations, and government, raising questions about whether the deci-
sion-making on online takedowns is truly private or might be more
accurately described as “co-regulatory.”138 This collaboration between
government and industry is widespread, especially when it comes to law
enforcement surveillance.139 The use of special law enforcement units to
track and request deletion of content is not unique to Europe—a recent
article noted that Vietnam had developed a special Internet monitoring
unit with over 10,000 workers, “tasked with fighting ‘wrongful views.’”140
Second, both the forum and the hash sharing reflect increasing pres-
sures on platforms to act “proactively” to develop new tools that will fa-
cilitate automatic content deletion. Despite the tension with longstanding
intermediary immunity principles that imposed no requirements for plat-
forms to monitor content, the European Commission has determined that
platforms “should remove illegal content as fast as possible,”141 and that
doing so is somehow consistent with the E-Commerce Directive’s immu-
136. Id. arts. 10, 11. Notably, however, the regulation provides that individuals shall not
be notified of content deletion if a “competent authority decides that there should be no
disclosure” because, for example, it is relevant to an investigation of terrorist offenses. Id.
art. 11. For reasons discussed infra, this exception will often apply.
137. Human Rights Guidelines for Internet Service Providers, COUNCIL EUR. ¶ 6 (2008),
https://rm.coe.int/16805a39d5 [https://perma.cc/XTC3-VC74].
138. Hui Zhen Gan, Note, Corporations: The Regulated or the Regulators? The Role of
IT Companies in Tackling Online Hate Speech in the EU, 24 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 111, 113,
117 (2017); see also Fabrizio Cafaggi et al., Private Regulation and Freedom of Expression,
11 INT’L J. COMM. 1998, 2002 (2017) (“[T]he degree of state involvement determines
whether private regulation becomes classifiable as co-regulation. When this is so, the state
may also have direct responsibility to verify that the private regime complies with the prin-
ciples enshrined in the ECHR.”).
139. Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Process Without Procedure: National Security Letters and
First Amendment Rights, 49 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 367, 368 (2016).
140. Glyn Moody, Revealed: Vietnam’s 10,000-Strong Internet Monitoring Force, Tasked
With Stamping Out ‘Wrongful Views’, TECHDIRT (Jan. 3, 2018), http://techdirt.com/articles/
20180102/03180438906/revealed-vietnams-10000-strong-internet-monitoring-force-tasked-
withstamping-out-wrongful-views.shtml [https://perma.cc/6DUH-ZD9W].
141. Communication, supra note 112, at 13.
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nity provision.142 This recommendation is also in tension with the Council
of Europe’s instruction that “[s]tate authorities should not directly or in-
directly impose a general obligation on intermediaries to monitor content
to which they give access, or which they transmit or store, be it by auto-
mated means or not.”143
Finally, both the hate speech and terrorist speech arrangements suffer
from serious transparency deficits. In the context of the hash sharing ar-
rangement, it is unclear whether content in the hash database is shared
with law enforcement, whether users are notified that content is in the
hash database, or whether there are any penalties for users who post or
repost hashed content. Moreover, it remains unclear whether counter-no-
tice or an appeals process is available.
In the context of the Code of Conduct, while the communication urges
platforms to provide users the ability to contest wrongful removal deci-
sions through counter-notice, it explicitly notes that counter-notice would
be inappropriate in criminal cases—which include, in many European ju-
risdictions, hate speech. Finally, the code encourages platforms to use
“out-of-court dispute settlement bodies to resolve disputes” about con-
tent removal, but many of those bodies reflect a strong presumption that
proceedings and awards shall not be made public.144
B. THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
A second context in which platforms are playing a major governance
role in adjudicating disputes about free expression and privacy online has
arisen in the context of European data protection law. In May, 2014, the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) recognized the “right to be forgotten,”
an individual right under the Data Protection Directive and the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.145 In Google Spain,
Mario Costeja Gonzalez brought suit against La Vanguardia, Google Inc.,
and Google Spain, seeking an order that would result in the deletion of
142. See Draft Terrorism Regulation, supra note 124, § 1.2 (“The present proposal is
consistent with the acquis related to the Digital Single Market and in particular the E-
Commerce Directive.”).
143. Recommendation CM/Rec(2017x)xx of the Committee of Ministers to Member
States on the Roles and Responsibilities of Internet Intermediaries, COUNCIL EUR. ¶ 1.3.3
(2016) [hereinafter Council of Europe Draft Recommendation], https://rm.coe.int/recom
mendation-cm-rec-2017x-xx-of-the-committee-of-ministers-to-member/1680731980 [https://
perma.cc/3U55-S5WV].
144. See, e.g., International Dispute Resolution Procedures, INT’L CTR. DISP. RESOL.
arts. 30, 37 (June 1, 2014), https://www.icdr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/
ICDR_Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/JMM8-L8MC] (Article 30: “An award may be made
public only with the consent of all parties or as required by law”) (Article 37: “Except as
provided in Article 30, unless otherwise agreed by the parties or required by applicable
law, the members of the arbitral tribunal and the Administrator shall keep confidential all
matters relating to the arbitration or the award.”); see also EU Privacy Shield Procedure
Rules, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, https://www.bbb.org/EU-privacy-shield/rules-and-policies/
[https://perma.cc/WFG8-SUBA] (Rule 8.2: “All deliberations, meetings, proceedings and
writings of the Procedure other than the Settlement Agreement or the Decision shall be
sealed from public access and shall be treated as confidential by CBBB.”).
145. Google Spain, supra note 8, ¶ 96.
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search results concerning 1998 “attachment proceedings for the recovery
of social security debts.”146 Costeja Gonzalez argued that the search re-
sults were totally irrelevant—the attachment proceedings had long been
resolved. Under Article 6 of the 1995 Data Protection Directive, moreo-
ver, data controllers were required to ensure that
personal data are processed “fairly and lawfully,” that they are “col-
lected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes,” that they are
“adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for
which they are collected and/or further processed,” that they are “ac-
curate and, where necessary, kept up to date” and, finally, that they
are “kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for
no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were
collected or for which they are further processed.”147
The ECJ found that, even where the processing of data was “initially
lawful,” it may, over time,
become incompatible with the directive where those data are no
longer necessary in the light of the purposes for which they were
collected or processed. That is so in particular where they appear to
be inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in rela-
tion to those purposes and in the light of the time that has elapsed.148
In other words, Costeja Gonzalez had a “right to be forgotten”—a right
he could assert against Google to force the company to take down search
results that were inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive.
While Costeja Gonzalez could prevail against Google, however, the
Spanish data protection authority had dismissed his claim against La
Vanguardia. Under the Data Protection Directive, EU Member States
had to provide “exemptions or derogations” from data protection man-
dates for the “processing of personal data carried out solely for journalis-
tic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression”—albeit only
in situations in which the right to privacy conflicted with free expres-
sion.149 Accordingly, the ECJ distinguished between the “activity of a
search engine” and “publishers of websites,”150 and determined that
search engines could not benefit from these exemptions.151 For that rea-
son, the court held that Costeja Gonzalez need not successfully obtain
relief from La Vanguardia before approaching Google.152
Google Spain suggested a partial list of factors that search engines
would have to weigh in considering right to be forgotten requests. As-
146. Id. ¶ 14.
147. Id. ¶ 72.
148. Id. ¶ 93.
149. Council Directive 95/46, art. 9, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 43 (EC).
150. Google Spain, supra note 8, ¶ 35.
151. Id. ¶ 85.
152. Id. (“It cannot therefore be ruled out that in certain circumstances the data subject
is capable of exercising the rights referred to in Article 12(b) and subparagraph (a) of the
first paragraph of Article 14 of Directive 95/46 against that operator but not against the
publisher of the web page.”).
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suming a data subject established that the information to be deleted was
“inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to
the purposes of the processing at issue carried out by the operator of the
search engine,”153 the court suggested that, as a rule, those rights would
“override” the public interest in the information.154 But the ECJ also an-
ticipated that search engines would have to undertake a careful factual
balancing that would
depend, in specific cases, on the nature of the information in ques-
tion and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private life and on the
interest of the public in having that information, an interest which
may vary, in particular, according to the role played by the data sub-
ject in public life.155
The court insinuated that there might be other reasons for a heightened
public interest in the information, but did not enumerate them.156
As Edward Lee has put it, the Google Spain opinion was largely silent
on “how to operationalize or put into practice, in the EU, a procedure
and a set of criteria for determining claims invoking the right to be for-
gotten in search engine results.”157 Instead, the burden fell on Google to
do so itself. Google convened an “Advisory Council” to assist it in formu-
lating “criteria that Google should use in striking a balance, such as what
role the data subject plays in public life, or whether the information is
outdated or no longer relevant.”158 In addition, the Article 29 Working
Party published guidelines and criteria for implementing the Google
Spain ruling.159
By July 2014, Google reported that it had received more than 70,000
take-down demands pertaining to 250,000 websites.160 The company com-
plained of the “difficult value judgments” it was having to make about
content including negative reviews, coverage of past crimes, and criticism
of politicians and policy choices: “in each case, someone wants the infor-
mation hidden, while others might argue it should be out in the open.”161
Google listed some of the criteria it used to weigh the deletion demands,
including whether
153. Id. ¶ 94.
154. Id. ¶ 97.
155. Id. ¶ 81.
156. Id. (“such as”).
157. Edward Lee, Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right
to Be Forgotten, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1017, 1035 (2016).
158. The Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten, GOOGLE (Feb. 6,
2015), https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/archive.google.com/en//advisorycouncil/
advisement/advisory-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/EL4X-HH4Q].
159. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the
Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment on “Google Spain and Inc v. Agencia
Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja Gonzalez” C-131/12 (Nov.
26, 2014) [hereinafter Guidelines on the Implementation of Google Spain], https://www
.pdpjournals.com/docs/88502.pdf [https://perma.cc/MLM5-YE5Q].
160. Searching for the right balance, GOOGLE (July 11, 2014), https://googleblog.blog
spot.be/2014/07/searching-for-right-balance.html [https://perma.cc/YQG8-JB4M].
161. Id.
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the information relates to a politician, celebrity, or other public fig-
ure; if the material comes from a reputable news source, and how
recent it is; whether it involves political speech; questions of profes-
sional conduct that might be relevant to consumers; the involvement
of criminal convictions that are not yet “spent”; and if the informa-
tion is being published by a government.162
The company also noted that, while it strived to be transparent about
the takedowns, it struggled to do so in a way that would not further in-
fringe on the privacy right of the data subject.163 Indeed, Google’s deci-
sion-making on the right to be forgotten raised hackles almost
immediately. In 2015, the BBC published a list of web pages that Google
had delisted from search results.164 The network reasoned that “the integ-
rity of the BBC’s online archive is important and, although the pages con-
cerned remain published on BBC Online, removal from Google searches
makes parts of that archive harder to find.”165 Julia Powles critiqued the
republication, arguing that it “only accentuates the demand for data pro-
tection rights.”166
In addition to deciding whether a user’s request to delete a link was
valid, the company also had to determine whether the link should be de-
leted in the user’s home country, in Europe, or worldwide. In May 2015,
the CNIL, the French data protection authority, issued an order requiring
Google to delist links across all of its geographic extensions, including
.com, and not only across .fr, .eu, and other European domains.167
Google refused to comply, but agreed to restrict access to the deleted
content within Europe by using geographic indicators, including IP ad-
dresses, to limit any access to the delisted links.168 In March 2016, the
Restricted Committee of the CNIL rebuffed this proposal, reasoning that
only global deletion, “regardless of the extension used or the geographic
162. Id.
163. Id. In 2017, the Higher Regional Court of Munich enjoined Google from forward-
ing takedown notices to the Lumen database, which documents efforts to remove online
content. Kieren McCarthy, When we said don’t link to the article, Google, we meant DON’T
LINK TO THE ARTICLE!, REGISTER (June 15, 2017), https://www.theregister.co.uk/
2017/06/15/google_germany_right_to_be_forgotten_court_case/ [https://perma.cc/JZ8P-
BSFA].
164. Neil McIntosh, List of BBC web pages which have been removed from Google’s
search results, BBC (June 25, 2015), www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/1d765aa8-600b-
4f32-b110-d02fbf7fd379 [https://perma.cc/8DSC-AJTT].
165. Id.
166. Julia Powles, Why the BBC is wrong to republish ‘right to be forgotten’ links,
GUARDIAN (July 1, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/01/bbc-wrong-
right-to-be-forgotten.
167. Right to be delisted: the CNIL Restricted Committee imposes a _100,000 fine on
Google, CNIL (Mar. 24 2016) [hereinafter CNIL, Right to be Delisted], https://www.cnil.fr/
en/right-be-delisted-cnil-restricted-committee-imposes-eu100000-fine-google [https://per
ma.cc/3F4U-LWQN].
168. Id.; Natasha Lomas, Google’s right to be forgotten appeal heading to Europe’s top
court, TECHCRUNCH (July 19, 2017), https://beta.techcrunch.com/2017/07/19/googles-right-
to-be-forgotten-appeal-heading-to-europes-top-court/ [https://perma.cc/T9D4-7DCE]
(“We’re doing this because we want to ensure that people have access to content that is
legal in their country.”) (statement of Peter Fleischer, Global Privacy Counsel, Google).
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origin of the person performing the search,” could effectively protect pri-
vacy and data protection rights.169 The CNIL reasoned that all of
Google’s search engines constituted a unified “data processing” opera-
tion, rendering each and every top level domain subject to French data
protection law.170 Google appealed the decision to the Conseil d’E´tat,
which referred the question to the European Court of Justice; the case is
still pending.
Google’s role in adjudicating right to be forgotten requests ruffled
some feathers. In August 2014, Johannes Masing, a judge on Germany’s
Federal Constitutional Court, wrote an essay predicting that the Google
Spain judgment would elevate search engine providers to “private arbi-
trators with far-reaching decision-making authority” over online commu-
nication.171 As Edward Lee has pointed out, it is easy to “envision a
different procedure,” in which domestic data protection authorities—not
Google—would serve as the gateway to adjudicate right to be forgotten
requests, “[b]ut that’s not what happened.”172
In 2018, Google published a significant report, Three Years of the Right
to Be Forgotten, detailing how the company has responded to the hun-
dreds of thousands of removal requests it has received.173 “In broad
terms,” the company relies on four criteria to balance the public interest
in the information against the requester’s privacy interest: the “validity”
of the request, the requester’s identity, the content of the information
requested to be delisted, and the source of the content.174 The company
identified two main categories of requests for delisting: content that re-
vealed “personal information” on social media or directory websites, and
content that revealed “legal history and professional information,” often
on news websites.175
Like the Code of Conduct, the implementation of the right to be for-
gotten raises a number of concerns about the absence of evenhanded
mechanisms for affected parties to vindicate their rights. Under Google
Spain and the Article 29 Working Party guidelines, only right to be for-
gotten requesters have standing to contest Google’s decisions not to take
down content. In other words, nobody has standing to challenge a deci-
sion by Google to delete content.
169. CNIL, Right to be Delisted, supra note 167.
170. Id.
171. Johannes Masing, RiBVerfG Masing: Vorla¨ufige Einscha¨tzung der, Google-Ent-
scheidung” des EuGH, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Aug. 14, 2014), https://verfassungsblog.de/
ribverfg-masing-vorlaeufige-einschaetzung-der-google-entscheidung-des-eugh/ [https://per
ma.cc/CES9-DLKH] (“Durch die Entscheidung des EuGH werden Suchmaschinenbe-
treiber als fu¨r Lo¨schungsantra¨ge Verantwortliche zu einer privaten Schiedsinstanz mit wei-
treichenden Entscheidungsbefugnissen u¨ber die Kommunikation im Netz erhoben.”).
172. Lee, supra note 157, at 1036.
173. THEO BERTRAM ET AL., GOOGLE, THREE YEARS OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOT-
TEN (Sept. 7, 2018), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1H4MKNwf5MgeztG7OnJRnl3ym3gIT
3HUK/view.
174. Id. at 2–3.
175. Id. at 15.
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In fact, although the European Court of Justice concluded in the
Telekabel case that users have standing to contest over-removal that re-
sults from judicial action, there is no clear path to do so when the removal
appears to result from private action.176 Although the Article 29 Working
Party urged search engines to balance publishers’ rights against the data
protection interests of right to be forgotten requesters,177 only the latter
have the legal ability to enforce their rights. Indeed, the Article 29 Work-
ing Party’s guidelines concluded that search engines should avoid notify-
ing web publishers about requests to de-list links to their content,
reasoning that publishers “have no control or influence” over data pro-
tection decisions and that “search engines do not recognize a legal right
of publishers to have their contents indexed and displayed, or displayed
in a particular order.”178
This lopsidedness chafes against free expression norms and values rec-
ognized in Europe and beyond. As the EU Human Rights Guidelines
suggest, “Any restriction that prevents the flow of information offline or
online must be in line with permissible limitations as set out in interna-
tional human rights law.”179 Successful efforts to extend the right to be
forgotten beyond search engines to newspapers underscore the dangers
to free expression. In 2016, the Belgian Court of Cassation upheld a deci-
sion requiring a Belgian newspaper to anonymize the online version of an
article regarding an individual’s involvement in a fatal car accident in
1994.180 The Belgian court determined that anonymizing the newspaper’s
archived article was less burdensome to free expression than de-indexing
or unpublishing the article. In the summer of 2018, the Spanish Constitu-
tional Court required the newspaper El Paı´s to de-index an article con-
cerning allegations of drug trafficking, concluding that anonymization
would pose a “greater interference” with free expression than de-index-
ing.181 It is hard to imagine that limitations left to the discretion of plat-
forms and enforceable only by those who request deletion could comport
with human rights law’s requirements.182
176. See Keller, The Right Tools, supra note 81, at 347.
177. Guidelines on the Implementation of Google Spain, supra note 159, at 10 (“In any
case, that [publisher’s] interest should be balanced with the rights, freedoms and interests
of the affected data subject.”).
178. Id.
179. EU Human Rights Guidelines, supra note 48.
180. Belgian Court of Cassation Rules on Right to Be Forgotten, PRIVACY & INFO. SE-
CURITY L. BLOG, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH (June 1, 2016), https://www.huntonprivacy
blog.com/2016/06/01/belgian-court-of-cassation-rules-on-right-to-be-forgotten/ [https://per
ma.cc/Q2BE-ECZG].
181. Raul Rubio et al., Spain — Landmark decision regarding the implementation of the
“right to be forgotten”, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail
.aspx?g=9f7db79b-d75c-4a7f-b6fe-91825ba27392 [https://perma.cc/W9N4-8S82].
182. See CHRISTINA ANGELOPOULOS ET AL., STUDY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS LIMI-
TATIONS FOR ONLINE ENFORCEMENT THROUGH SELF-REGULATION 14 (2016) (“The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights has developed a standard test to determine whether Article
10, ECHR, has been violated. Put simply, whenever it has been established that there has
been an interference with the right to freedom of expression, that interference must first of
all be prescribed by law. In other words, it must be adequately accessible and reasonably
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IV. CRITIQUES OF PLATFORM GOVERNANCE
Each of the foregoing examples of the regimes surrounding online con-
tent implicates user privacy, expressive freedoms, the free flow of infor-
mation, and countervailing interests. Platforms play varying roles in
governance in each of these settings, and each reflects a different ap-
proach to adopting public law norms or including public institutions
within these governance arrangements.
In the context of the effort to tamp down hate speech and terrorist
speech, for example, takedown requests come from across the spectrum
of private individuals, civil society organizations, and state institutions
such as internet referral units. By participating in the voluntary “hash
database,” platforms proactively attempt to identify terrorist content for
deletion themselves, without the prodding of outside actors. In this con-
text, speakers’ interests are underrepresented in comparison with the
government’s interest in monitoring, suppressing, and counteracting ille-
gal speech online. While the European Commission’s Communication on
Tackling Illegal Content Online instructs that “[r]obust safeguards to
limit the risk of removal of legal content also should be available, sup-
ported by a set of meaningful transparency obligations to increase ac-
countability of the removal processes,” the shape of these safeguards is
far from clear.183 This directive raises further questions about whether
safeguards intended to protect free expression have been developed en-
tirely by private entities,184 or with the input or oversight of government
actors.
Of course, it is also anyone’s guess as to whether these mechanisms are
effective to protect free expression.185
These kinds of questions have given rise to two major critiques of the
global pressures on online platforms to govern speech. At the risk of
oversimplifying, I cast these critiques as (1) substantive and (2) procedu-
ral. While both critiques have some merit, they are also both partially
wrong—and incomplete.
foreseeable in its consequences. Second, it must pursue a legitimate aim (i.e., correspond to
one of the aims set out in Article 10(2)). Third, it must be necessary in a democratic soci-
ety, i.e., it must correspond to a ‘pressing social need’, and it must be proportionate to the
legitimate aim(s) pursued.”); see also Aleksandra Kuczerawy, The Power of Positive Think-
ing: Intermediary Liability and the Effective Enjoyment of the Right to Freedom of Expres-
sion, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECHNOLOGY & E-COM. L. 226, 233 (2017) (observing that,
under the European Convention on Human Rights, freedom of expression has positive as
well as negative dimensions).
183. Communication, supra note 112, ¶ 4; see also Daphne Keller, Counter-Notice Does
Not Fix Over-Removal of Online Speech, STAN. CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Oct. 5,
2017) [hereinafter Keller, Counter-Notice], http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2017/10/count
er-notice-does-not-fix-over-removal-online-speech [https://perma.cc/74J5-UZ3D].
184. See generally Klonick, supra note 14.
185. Communication, supra note 112, ¶ 4; see also Keller, Counter-Notice, supra note
183.
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A. SUBSTANTIVE CRITIQUES: PLATFORMS ARE ACHIEVING
THE WRONG BALANCE
At its core, the substantive critique complains that when platforms
weigh speech rights against other rights, they strike the wrong balance.
This critique has emerged particularly sharply in the context of the right
to be forgotten. It is difficult, if not impossible, for American observers to
square the right to be forgotten with the First Amendment’s strong pro-
tections for publishing truthful information.186 As some media law practi-
tioners have noted, European privacy law has a different perspective on
what is newsworthy than the First Amendment.187 Some are concerned
that search engines and others will adopt a default presumption in favor
of deletion in order to avoid financial penalties, thus chilling even lawful
speech.188 This concern is especially pronounced in light of Google’s find-
ing that a significant portion of links requested to be delisted are from
news websites.189
In essence, many of these critics simply object on normative grounds to
the European approach, which appears to prioritize individual privacy
rights equally highly or perhaps even above press freedoms and the free
flow of information. This balance simply would not pass muster under
U.S. constitutional law, which privileges First Amendment freedoms
above privacy rights.190 These concerns have been exacerbated by the
ongoing battles over whether the right to be forgotten should extend
abroad. U.S.-based civil society organizations have explicitly rejected the
idea that the right to be forgotten could apply globally because of con-
cerns about its impact on First Amendment rights. In response to the
CNIL’s decision that Google was required to delist links across all of its
domains in order to vindicate the right to be forgotten, the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, a U.S.-based association of report-
186. Jasmine E. McNealy, The Emerging Conflict Between Newsworthiness and the
Right to Be Forgotten, 39 N. KY. L. REV. 119, 128 (2012) (concluding that various ap-
proaches to defining “newsworthiness” “seem to offer great First Amendment protection
for the publication of truthful, yet private, information”).
187. Ashley Messenger, What Would a “Right to Be Forgotten” Mean for Media in the
United States, 29 COMM. LAW. 29, 35 (2012); see also Kurt Wimmer, The Long Arm of the
European Privacy Regulator: Does the New EU GDPR Reach U.S. Media Companies?, 33
COMM. LAW. 16, 18 (2017) (arguing that a successful challenge to the application of the
GDPR to a U.S. media organization would require showing that the GDPR conflicts with
the First Amendment, “and that the publisher’s free expression interests outweigh the Eu-
ropean Union’s interest in safeguarding its citizens’ privacy rights”); Charles D. Tobin &
Christine N. Walz, Right to Be Forgotten, Expungement Laws Raise New Challenges on the
40th Anniversary of Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 31 COMM. LAW. 4, 4 (2015) (contending
that the right to be forgotten threatens the “black-and-white” protection for reporting of
truthful facts).
188. Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 90–91
(2012).
189. BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 173, at 15.
190. See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1049 (2000); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 580 (2011) (striking down Ver-
mont’s regulation of the sale and use of prescriber-identifiable information for drug mar-
keting purposes on First Amendment grounds).
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ers and editors, wrote a letter expressing concern about exporting censor-
ship, arguing that “[i]nternational free expression cannot survive on the
Internet if every nation’s laws apply to every website.”191 The Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF) published a report that stated in part that the
right to be forgotten “fundamentally contradicts U.S. laws and rights, in-
cluding those protected by the First Amendment.”192
Although the right to be forgotten has drawn particularly potent objec-
tions—perhaps because its balance between the public interest in the free
flow of information and the private interest in delisting explicitly subverts
the balance under existing First Amendment jurisprudence—platforms
have also been accused of censoring user speech in other contexts. Nu-
merous civil society organizations in the United States as well as in Eu-
rope have opposed the European Commission’s Code of Conduct on the
basis that it is over broad and may chill lawful expression.193 As a general
matter, it is well recognized that “broad secondary liability for in-
termediaries may also chill speech or stop legal conduct as a result of
over-enforcement.”194 Jennifer Urban and others have documented how
Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act has resulted in over-
enforcement of copyright claims and under-enforcement of speech
protections.195
191. Letter from The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press to Isabelle Falque-
Pierrotin, President, Commission nationale de l’informatique et des liberte´s (Sep. 14,
2015), https://www.rcfp.org/sites/default/files/RCFP_CNIL_Sept14-English.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/L4UB-L5VB].
192. David Greene et al., Rights at Odds: Europe’s Right to Be Forgotten Clashes with
U.S. Law, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 2016), https://www.eff.org/files/2016/11/29/rtbf-
us_law_legal_background.pdf [https://perma.cc/UB53-S7EE].
193. See, e.g., Jillian C. York, European Commission’s Hate Speech Deal With Compa-
nies Will Chill Speech, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 3, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deep-
links/2016/06/european-commissions-hate-speech-deal-companies-will-chill-speech [https://
perma.cc/9KNV-PFYS]; ARTICLE 19, EU: EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S CODE OF CONDUCT
FOR COUNTERING ILLEGAL HATE SPEECH ONLINE AND THE FRAMEWORK DECISION 15–16
(June 2016), https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38430/EU-Code-of-conduct-
analysis-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7NX-FB5F] (expressing “serious concerns”); Joe
McNamee, Guide to the Code of Conduct on Hate Speech, EUR. DIGITAL RIGHTS (June 3,
2016), https://edri.org/guide-code-conduct-hate-speech/ [https://perma.cc/VFX3-7DUV].
194. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A Comparative Analysis of the Secondary Liability of On-
line Service Providers, in 25 IUS COMPARATUM – GLOBAL STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE LAW
18 (2017); see also Council of Europe Draft Recommendation, supra note 143, ¶ 1.3.3 (“The
imposition of sanctions for non-compliance may prompt over-regulation and speedy take-
down of all dubious content, which may result in an overall chilling effect for the freedom
of expression online.”).
195. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Ef-
fects”? Takedown Notices under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 682 (2006) (“[T]he implications for
expression on the Internet of this extrajudicial process appear, from our limited data, sig-
nificant. Removal of speech from the Internet, with very little or no process, is a strong
remedy for allegations of infringement, especially where there are so few recourses availa-
ble to the targeted speaker.”). See also Urban et al., supra note 68, at 10 (“[R]elying on
machines to make decisions about sometimes-nuanced copyright law raises questions
about the effect on expression.”); Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s
Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 171, 176 (2010).
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These critiques of platform “censorship” of speech are in substantial
tension with the concept of platforms as “editors” or “speakers” in their
own right.196 As Heather Whitney notes, in domestic litigation, “Google
and others have argued that their decisions concerning their platforms—
for example, what sites to list (or delist) and in what order, who can buy
ads and where to place them, and what users to block or permanently
ban—are analogous to the editorial decisions of publishers.”197 This ac-
count of platforms serving as “editors,” curating content and making
choices about what information is newsworthy, suggests—in an American
perspective—that those choices are worthy of protection from govern-
ment meddling.
To the extent platforms are truly functioning as editors, it can hardly be
argued that their decisions about what content to display are illegitimate.
Yet it is equally clear that when platforms are required or coerced to
delete content in order to avoid legal liability, a different paradigm ought
to apply. When platforms act as “proxy censors”198 or “collateral cen-
sors,”199 they are distinct from neutral or beneficent “curators” or “edi-
tors.” Indeed, implicit in calls to require additional safeguards for content
deletion is a rejection of the editorial analogy in the context of coercive
censorship, and with it a rejection of the platforms’ power over private
speech.
B. PROCEDURAL CRITIQUES: PLATFORMS SHOULDN’T
MAKE THE RULES
Scholars and civil society organizations have also criticized the proce-
dural deficits of global speech governance, arguing that private compa-
nies such as Google, Twitter, and Facebook are ill-suited to the task of
making decisions about what kinds of speech are—and are not—
protected.
In that vein, scholars and civil society actors have criticized the role
that private companies are playing in adjudicating disputes and making
rules about online speech.200 For example, Eldar Haber has described the
role of search engines in administering the right to be forgotten as akin to
196. See, e.g., Heather Whitney, Search Engines, Social Media, and the Editorial Anal-
ogy, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. 9–10 (2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/
files/content/Heather_Whitney_Search_Engines_Editorial_Analogy.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F7Y9-VKTF]; see also Klonick, supra note 14, at 1609 (“Depending on the type of interme-
diary involved, courts have analogized platforms to established doctrinal areas in First
Amendment law—company towns, broadcasters, editors—and the rights and obligations
of a platform shift depending on which analogy is applied.”).
197. Whitney, supra note 196, at 3.
198. Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet In-
termediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 14 (2006).
199. Balkin, supra note 59, at 2309.
200. See On the “Right to Be Forgotten”: Challenges and Suggested Changes to the Data
Protection Regulation, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (May 2, 2013), https://cdt.org/files/
pdfs/CDT-Free-Expression-and-the-RTBF.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8RE-E2UB] (“Private
companies are ill-equipped to take responsibility for decisions that balance the right to
privacy with the right to free expression.”); Aleksandra Kuczerawy & Jef Ausloos, From
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a private judiciary, arguing that existing mechanisms are insufficient to
render Google’s decision-making accountable.201 Kyle Langvardt has
likewise argued that speech governance by online platforms is inappropri-
ate because the companies are not chosen through a democratic process,
but rather are “politically unaccountable technology oligarchs [who] ex-
ercise state-like censorship powers.”202 A number of international organi-
zations have also addressed the proper role of private companies in the
context of intermediary liability—the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe, for example, has recommended that “excessive and
disproportionate” takedown obligations “create a clear risk of transfer-
ring regulation and adjudication of Internet freedom rights to private ac-
tors and should be avoided.”203
Like the substantive critique of speech governance by platforms, the
procedural critique dismisses the “editorial analogy” that compares plat-
forms to newspapers in their own right.204 Seeing platforms, instead, as
(more or less) willing collaborators with or stand-ins for government cen-
sors—as arms of the state—critics have sought to apply the same stan-
dards to private platforms as to states themselves.205
Some new developments suggest that platforms have taken this charge
seriously and are responding in ways intended to bolster their own legiti-
macy. For instance, when Google published its Three Years of the Right to
Be Forgotten report, it explicitly recognized the vital importance of its
own decision-making role, writing, “Understanding how we make these
types of decisions—and how people are using new rights like those
Notice-and-Takedown to Notice-and-Delist: Implementing Google Spain, 14 COLO. TECH.
L.J. 219, 232 (describing concerns with “search engines as arbitrators”).
201. Eldar Haber, Privatization of the Judiciary, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 115, 152–53
(2017).
202. Langvardt, supra note 14, at 1358; see also Lee, supra note 157, at 1066–67 (“[T]his
delegation of power raises serious concerns for democratic accountability and due
process.”).
203. Press Release, Dunja Mijatoviæ, OSCE Rep. on Freedom of the Media, Org. for
Security & Cooperation in Europe, Communique´ No.1/2016 (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www
.osce.org/fom/219391?download=true; see also Council of Europe Draft Recommendation,
supra note 143, ¶ 1.3.2 (“State authorities shall seek to obtain an order by a judicial author-
ity or other fully independent and impartial state entity when demanding intermediaries to
restrict access to unlawful content. State authorities should not require internet in-
termediaries to restrict access to third-party content based on their own assessment of its
lawfulness. They should further ensure that internet intermediaries do not restrict access to
third-party content based on their own assessment of its lawfulness without ensuring
proper redress mechanisms and adherence to due process guarantees.”).
204. Whitney, supra note 196, at 5.
205. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction
at 14, Prager Univ. v. Google, No. 5:17-cv-06064-LHK, 2018 WL 1471939 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
29, 2017) (“Although Defendants are not public entities, they are ‘state actors’ for the
purposes of both the First Amendment and Liberty of Speech claims because they operate
and hold YouTube out to the public as the functional equivalent of a public forum, where
the general public is invited and solicited to use the platform as place for ‘freedom of
expression’ and ‘freedom of information’ where ‘everyone’s voice can be heard.’”).
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granted by the European Court—is important.”206 Facebook also plans to
create an “independent body” to render “transparent and binding” deci-
sions on content-related decisions, writing that independence would “cre-
ate accountability and oversight.”207
Platforms’ recognition of their own governance role—and their steps to
enhance their legitimacy and accountability—may not satisfy critics who
also object to the extensive cooperation between platforms and govern-
ments on procedural grounds. For example, the Center for Democracy
and Technology (CDT) has taken issue with law enforcement agencies’
role as “trusted flaggers” that notify platforms of content that violates
their ToS.208 In the recommendation on measures to effectively tackle
illegal content online, the European Commission applauded the use of
Internet referral units—law enforcement units intended to ferret out un-
lawful Internet activities—in a “trusted flagger” role.
The use of public police agencies as enforcers of private companies’
ToS exhibits at least two of the features of what Jack Balkin calls “new
school” speech regulation.209 First, the European Commission’s Code of
Conduct and the other “co-regulatory” initiatives to curb hate speech
have taken place against the background of explicit threats to regulate
and penalize online platforms for illicit content.210 This is precisely what
Balkin calls “collateral censorship” and what Seth Kreimer terms “proxy
censorship”: the state’s technique of coercing private companies to censor
speech that the government could not itself lawfully sanction.211
206. Michee Smith, Updating our “right to be forgotten” Transparency Report, GOOGLE
(Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.blog.google/around-the-globe/google-europe/updating-our-
right-be-forgotten-transparency-report/.
207. Mark Zuckerberg, A Blueprint for Content Governance and Enforcement,
FACEBOOK (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-blueprint-
for-content-governance-and-enforcement/10156443129621634/; see also Nick Clegg, Chart-
ing a Course for an Oversight Board for Content Decisions, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Jan.
28, 2019), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/01/oversight-board/ (publicizing plan to
“build a board that creates accountability and oversight of our content policy and enforce-
ment decisions”); Draft Charter: An Oversight Board for Content Decisions, FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM, https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/draft-charter-oversight-
board-for-content-decisions-2.pdf (describing plans to create an independent “oversight
board” for Facebook).
208. Emma Llanso´, Who Needs Courts? A Deeper Look At the European Commission’s
Plans to Speed Up Content Takedowns, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://cdt.org/blog/who-needs-courts-a-deeper-look-at-the-european-commissions-plans-
to-speed-up-content-takedowns/ [https://perma.cc/ZD7W-4CCE].
209. Balkin, supra note 59, at 2306.
210. See, e.g., Gibbs, supra note 104; Jessica Elgot, May and Macron plan joint crack-
down on online terror, GUARDIAN (June 12, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/
2017/jun/12/may-macron-online-terror-radicalisation [https://perma.cc/34QN-CPHK]
(“Theresa May will attempt to reassert control over the political agenda by agreeing a new
counter-terror strategy with the French president, vowing to fine tech companies such as
Facebook and Google if they do not step up efforts to combat online radicalisation.”).
211. Balkin, supra note 59, at 2309 (“Collateral censorship occurs when the state holds
one private party A liable for the speech of another private party B, and A has the power
to block, censor, or otherwise control access to B’s speech.”); Kreimer, supra note 198, at
28 (noting that proxy censorship “provides a mechanism for the exercise of authority over
otherwise ungovernable conduct”).
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The second aspect of government participation in enforcing platforms’
ToS that has troubled scholars and civil society organizations is the blur-
ring of distinctions between the power wielded by public agencies and
that held by private companies. As Balkin notes, “Public/private coopera-
tion and co-optation are hallmarks of new-school speech regulation.”212
Cooperation and co-optation are particularly concerning where they slide
into “soft censorship” or “jawboning” by persuading or pressuring plat-
forms to adopt government’s favored limitations on speech, because they
limit the ability of the public to hold the government accountable for
those limitations.213 Just so, in the context of the trusted flagger contro-
versy, CDT objected that “government actors must be held accountable
for the action they take to censor speech, even if another party is the
ultimate implementer of the decision.”214
The “procedural” critique of platform governance is thus twofold. First,
the procedures that platforms themselves use to determine whether con-
tent should be deleted are insufficient to safeguard user rights. Some plat-
forms, including Google and Facebook, appear to be attempting to solve
this problem through more transparent and accountable mechanisms. But
the ways in which platforms cooperate with governments—especially in
informal arrangements—pose particular obstacles to procedural fairness
and accountability. This challenge remains daunting even in light of the
steps platforms are taking to enhance their own accountability.
C. LOOKING FOR LAWS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES
At bottom, both the procedural and substantive critiques of current
modes of online speech governance are primarily concerned with demo-
cratic accountability and legitimacy in the context of decision-making by
private actors. Procedural critics have decried the lack of oversight, the
opacity, and the lack of effective notice or appeal mechanisms that char-
acterize both the Code of Conduct and the right to be forgotten.215 Sub-
stantive critics appear particularly concerned that foreign laws might
unduly influence the information to which American Internet users have
212. Balkin, supra note 59, at 2324.
213. See Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 905 (2012)
(“Soft censorship is deeply problematic from the perspective of the process-oriented legiti-
macy methodology.”); Derek E. Bambauer, Against Jawboning, 100 MINN. L. REV. 51
(2015) (arguing that informal government pressure on platforms, or “jawboning,” suffers
from legitimacy deficits); see also Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies, 96 CALIF L.
REV. 901, 923–24 (2008) (describing how “informal” relationships between the government
and private sector in the intelligence context might facilitate avoidance of public scrutiny,
oversight, and accountability).
214. Llanso´, supra note 208.
215. Langvardt, supra note 14; see also Lee, supra note 157; Haber, supra note 201;
Daphne Keller, Notice and Takedown under the GDPR: An Operational Overview, STAN.
CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Oct. 29, 2015) [hereinafter Keller, Notice and Takedown],
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/10/notice-and-takedown-under-gdpr-operational-
overview#_ftnref11 [https://perma.cc/BL8F-D4WA].
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Some have thus called for additional government oversight of corpo-
rate speech governance. For instance, Kyle Langvardt has suggested that
online content moderation should be subject to administrative and judi-
cial review to ensure that it comports with First Amendment principles
and values.217 Edward Lee has called for the creation of a “hybrid
agency” that would oversee right to be forgotten requests and takedowns
in Europe and “bridge” the divide between private enterprise and gov-
ernment.218 Eldar Haber has argued in favor of leaving the determination
of right to be forgotten requests in the judicial system rather than in pri-
vate adjudicators’ hands.219 But although these proposals appear moti-
vated by the laudable goal of clarifying the respective roles of states and
platforms in governance, that blurring of influence and power is in fact
useful to the state, which may prefer “soft” methods of censorship to
overt mechanisms precisely because they are less visible.220
In a sense, these concerns are similar to those that have animated an
extensive body of scholarship examining legitimacy and accountability
within the administrative state, particularly as government roles become
increasingly privatized.221 In the domestic context, these concerns have
prompted scholars to explore whether, and when, private governance
might constitute “state action” and thus be subject to constitutional limi-
tations.222 This effort reflects a growing sense that the blurred boundaries
between public and private power raise significant questions for individ-
ual rights and liberties.223 But, as Jody Freeman has pointed out, the state
216. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, ATLANTIC (July–Aug. 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/the-right-to-be-forgotten/309044/
(“This would transform Facebook and Google from neutral platforms into global censors
and would clash directly with the principle, embedded in U.S. free-speech law, that people
can’t be restricted from publishing embarrassing but truthful information.”).
217. Langvardt, supra note 14, at 1377.
218. Lee, supra note 157, at 1083.
219. Haber, supra note 201, at 149–50, 172.
220. See Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, supra note 213, at 930 (“Should the govern-
ment censor the Net, however, it should do so directly—using legislation that is tailored to
the problem, that incorporates safeguards informed by the history of prior restraint, and
that creates a system that is open, transparent, narrow, and accountable. Hard censorship
is superior to soft censorship in achieving legitimacy.”); see also Michaels, supra note 213,
at 924 (describing how “informal collaboration with minimal-to-no-reporting to Congress
or the courts” allows intelligence agencies and contractors to benefit from secrecy).
221. See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law for a New Century, in THE
PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 91–92 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997); David Mullan,
Administrative Law at the Margins, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 135
(Michael Taggart ed., 1997); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness
and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 515 (2003) (“A model
fixated on accountability cannot adequately address the concerns for arbitrariness neces-
sary for a truly legitimate administrative state.”); Freeman, supra note 16, at 546.
222. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 16, at 576 (“[M]any scholars have argued that, in
certain contexts, private actors ought to submit to oversight by agencies, courts, and the
legislature, and to be constrained by the Constitution in the same manner as traditional
public agencies are.”).
223. Mullan, supra note 221, at 153 (suggesting that “in an era of deregulation, priva-
tization, and corporatization,” the number of “inherent state domestic roles” may be dwin-
dling as the responsibilities of private actors grow).
2019] Global Platform Governance 65
action doctrine is not the only option for promoting accountability of pri-
vate companies’ decision-making processes. As Freeman demonstrates,
private and soft law can also become a fruitful source of accountability-
enhancing mechanisms by “importing” public law norms and enshrining
accountability mechanisms in contract, relying on private standard-setting
groups, and other soft-law tools designed to enhance accountability and
legitimacy.224 Imposing various post hoc safeguards may “render agencies
indirectly accountable to the electorate,” even in the absence of direct
government participation or involvement.225
In seeking to boost public accountability through government over-
sight, critics of platform governance largely overlook the broad range of
alternative methods that exist to hold private entities accountable for reg-
ulatory choices and determinations that affect individuals.226 They also
tend to underplay the dangers of promoting a robust role for government
in determining the legality of online content. Classical free expression
thinking suggests that private decision-making is to be preferred to gov-
ernment interference: government involvement transforms editorial se-
lection into censorship. Indeed, protections for editorial choices are
premised on the view that selectivity itself implicates free expression
rights. In a U.S. framework, the principle that government interventions
limiting speech must be justified stems from First Amendment doctrine;
private actors, of course, can choose to speak (or not to) arbitrarily or for
any reason whatsoever.
More troubling, neither the substantive nor the procedural critiques of
platform governance pay sufficient heed to the global context in which
platforms are operating or to jurisdictional conflicts regarding free ex-
pression and privacy values. Arguments that the First Amendment pro-
vides the appropriate benchmark wrongly assume that the U.S. domestic
context is the most relevant one. For example, Langvardt’s suggestion
that First Amendment standards should guide platforms when they take
down content that violates terms of service ignores the global reach of
platforms’ community standards and assumes that the U.S. Constitution
is, and should be, the operative legal constraint on international busi-
nesses.227 But falling back on the First Amendment as the appropriate
legal standard essentially doubles down on American unilateralism
online.
Far from offering an achievable solution to governments’ increasingly
overlapping and conflicting demands in the areas of speech and privacy
governance, overreliance on U.S. legal standards replicates the worst fea-
tures of American exceptionalism; it uncritically assumes not only that
224. Freeman, supra note 16, at 588–90.
225. Id. at 546.
226. An exception is Edward Lee, supra note 157, whose work is exceptionally thought-
ful about the range of constraints to private power that might apply in the context of the
right to be forgotten.
227. Langvardt, supra note 14, at 1385 (arguing for content moderation that “aligns . . .
with the doctrine and the priorities of First Amendment law”).
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American law does govern, but also that it is normatively preferable and
should supply the baseline standard for a de facto global regulation.228
First Amendment doctrine is not value-neutral, and in the words of
Yochai Benkler, the incorporation of one nation’s values “into the tech-
nology of communication shared by many displaces those of other na-
tions.”229 When critics assume that the imposition of First Amendment
standards on global platform governance is value-neutral, they embrace a
unilateral approach to speech and privacy on the global web.230
In essence, the harshest substantive and procedural critics of platform
governance are preoccupied with the domestic effects of global platform
governance. But because of the global reach of internal platform govern-
ance structures, ToS, and other rules, platform governance has become an
intractable global problem not susceptible to an easy fix either by apply-
ing domestic substantive law or procedural protections.231 Nor is a do-
mestic focus sufficient to understand platforms’ roles in governing speech
and privacy online. Rather, a new vocabulary is necessary to understand
the legitimacy and accountability problems that confront platform
governance.
V. DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, LEGITIMACY,
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Platform governance muddles state and private power. At a minimum,
the examples of the Code of Conduct and the right to be forgotten illus-
trate that in numerous circumstances, platforms’ decisions about online
content are not theirs alone, but are informed—if not compelled—by
government actors as well. In short, platform governance is characterized
by “a deep interdependence among public and private actors in accom-
plishing the business of governance.”232 This mixed responsibility for de-
cision-making on online speech and privacy makes ensuring
accountability more complicated, but it is not a hopeless task.
Private governance across international borders does raise special con-
cerns about legitimacy and accountability because it is two steps removed
from a democratic process: platform governance occurs outside tradi-
tional state-based accountability mechanisms and is instantiated by
228. See Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEP-
TIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 30 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) (positing that the First
Amendment is “generally stronger” than its international peers, “but stronger in ways that
may also reflect an exceptional though not necessarily correct understanding of the rela-
tionship between freedom of expression and other goals, other interests, and other
rights”).
229. Yochai Benkler, Internet Regulation: A Case Study in the Problem of Unilateralism,
11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 174 (2000).
230. See Franz Mayer, Europe and the Internet: The Old World and the New Medium, 11
EUR. J. INT’L L. 149, 161 (2000) (arguing that, with regard to internet governance,
“Europeans suspect that public and private interests in the US are aiming at structuring the
use of and the behaviour in the digital networks along American lines”).
231. Daskal, supra note 13, at 219; Eichensehr, supra note 13; Citron, supra note 3.
232. Freeman, supra note 16, at 547.
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unelected, non-state actors.233 As in many settings in which unelected or-
ganizations create and implement rules bearing on national sovereignty
and individual rights—to name just two interests—instead of the utopian
direct democracy we might have expected in the heady days of the 1990s,
we have a not insignificant democratic deficit instead. These concerns are
heightened by substantive distinctions between national legal systems in
this area. But these concerns are not unique to the digital context. In-
deed, the same issues have long been at the core of efforts to demonstrate
that global governance by a variety of private, public, and hybrid actors
can be legitimated and made accountable to the public.
Moreover, the legitimacy concerns surrounding “private govern-
ance”234—even in the context of the Internet—are hardly new, and are
not limited to censorship or speech. In 2000, James Boyle predicted that
Internet governance would be characterized by increased privatization:
“unable to respond at Internet speed, and limited by pesky constitutional
constraints, the state can use private surrogates to achieve its goals.”235 In
the same symposium, Michael Froomkin and Jonathan Weinberg likewise
raised questions about ICANN’s unaccountable governance of the do-
main name system.236 More recently, Jennifer Daskal has recognized that
states’ efforts to regulate cross-border data flows, particularly in the con-
text of law enforcement efforts to compel production of data stored
abroad, constitute “a new form of international rulemaking,” one
achieved by market forces rather than states, or international
organizations.237
Yet although mechanisms exist for promoting the accountability and
legitimacy of global speech governance, they have gone largely unex-
plored.238 Against this background, the literature on global governance
and global administrative law is particularly resonant.
A. LEGITIMACY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN PRIVATE GOVERNANCE
At bottom, the two critiques of platform governance outlined above
reflect concerns about the legitimacy and accountability of rights govern-
233. See, e.g., id. at 574 (“Private actors exacerbate all of the concerns that make the
exercise of agency discretion so problematic. They are one step further removed from di-
rect accountability to the electorate.”).
234. See generally Klonick, supra note 14.
235. James Boyle, A Nondelegation Doctrine for the Digital Age?, 50 DUKE L.J. 5, 10
(2000).
236. A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around
the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 29 (2000) (analyzing accountability deficit
resulting from ICANN’s governance of the DNS system); Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and
the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 191–92 (2000); see also Dawn Nunziato,
Freedom of Expression, Democratic Norms, and Internet Governance, 52 EMORY L.J. 187,
187–88 (2003) (analyzing ICANN’s role in governing online speech).
237. Daskal, supra note 13, at 233 (“[T]hrough the de facto operation of the market and
the multinational corporations that operate across borders—rather than the more formal
and mutually agreed upon process of treaty making amongst states or international organi-
zations setting standards that impose obligations on participating states.”).
238. Cf. id. at 238.
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ance beyond the state. Reframing these critiques cuts to the heart of the
issue: rather than debating about the nature of platforms’ power, the right
question is whether the exercise of that power is legitimate, or worthy of
recognition.239 While questions of legitimacy in states and governments
have long preoccupied political theorists, scholars have also observed
that, as globalization diversified the sources of power in both domestic
and global politics, new kinds of legitimacy questions emerged.240 Many
legitimacy-based critiques of international and supranational institutions
focus on the redistribution of power from nation states to specific interna-
tional organizations such as the World Trade Organization, International
Monetary Fund, and World Bank,241 or to supranational institutions such
as the European Union.242 These actors were increasingly capable of ex-
ercising “many of the powers of a state,” but lacked the “typical processes
and structures” of democratic accountability that were necessary to hold
states to account.243 Scholars have sought, too, to find ways of legitimat-
ing the exercise of political power by private actors.244 As a result, the
struggle to find democratic mechanisms to legitimize “governance be-
yond the nation-state” and on a global scale is familiar to scholars of
global politics, international relations, and international law.245
239. Ju¨rgen Habermas, Legitimation Problems in the Modern State, in THE HABERMAS
READER 248–49 (William Outhwaite ed., 1996).
240. See Ju¨rgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democ-
racy, in THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL ESSAYS 67 (Max Pensky ed.,
1998) (“Which aspects of globalization could potentially degrade the capacity for demo-
cratic self-steering within a national society? Are there functional equivalents at the supra-
national level for deficits that emerge at the level of the nation-state?”).
241. See Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaı¨dis, Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why
Constitutionalizing the WTO Is a Step Too Far, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY:
THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 247–48 (Roger B. Porter et
al. eds., 2001); Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Club Model of International
Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGIT-
IMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 265 (Roger B. Porter
et al. eds., 2001); Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Gov-
ernance Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 405, 406 (2006); Michael Zu¨rn, Global Gov-
ernance and Legitimacy Problems, 39 GOV’T & OPP. 260, 260–61 (2004).
242. See, e.g., Francesca E. Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European Community
Rulemaking: A Call for Notice and Comment in Comitology, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 451,
451–52 (1999); Gra´inne de Bu´rca, The Quest for Legitimacy in the European Union, 59
MOD. L. REV. 349, 352 (1996).
243. de Bu´rca, supra note 242, at 352.
244. See A. Claire Cutler et al., Introduction, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS 6 (A. Claire Cutler et al. eds., 1999) (“[C]ooperation among private sec-
tor actors can become authoritative or government-like, even in the international sphere,
thus challenging our notions of the character of political authority itself.”); Rodney Bruce
Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker, The Emergence of Private Authority in the International Sys-
tem, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 4–5 (Rodney
Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002); see also HABERMAS, supra note 239, at 248
(“Only political orders can have and lose legitimacy; only they need legitimation. Multina-
tional corporations or the world market are not capable of legitimation.”).
245. Michael Zu¨rn, Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State: The EU and
Other International Institutions, 6 EUR. J. INT’L RELATIONS 183 (2000); see also Gra´inne de
Bu´rca, Developing Democracy Beyond the State, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 221, 223
(2008).
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The global governance literature also reflects two distinct concepts of
legitimacy: the “normative” concept, which concerns whether an institu-
tion “has a right to rule,” and the “descriptive or sociological” perspec-
tive, which concerns whether that authority is in fact accepted.246 A
normative perspective on legitimacy, which questions the “validity of po-
litical decisions and political orders and their claim to legitimacy,” closely
resembles the arguments lodged by the proceduralist critics of platform
governance.247 Are platforms the actors best equipped to govern disputes
about online speech and privacy? Are they sufficiently accountable to the
public, and do they operate within a democratic framework? These ques-
tions are different from the question of whether platforms are reaching
the right outcomes when they participate in governance, a question which
concerns the “societal acceptance” of those decisions.248
As a descriptive matter, scholars of global administrative law have also
recognized that the sources of regulatory and adjudicative power are in-
creasingly heterodox. As Nico Krisch and Benedict Kingsbury pointed
out in 2006, new kinds of actors in the “global administrative space” per-
form “recognizably administrative and regulatory functions: the setting
and application of rules by bodies that are not legislative or primarily
adjudicative in character.”249 In The Emergence of Global Administrative
Law, Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart distinguish five types of “globalized
administrative regulation” existing along a spectrum reflecting varying
degrees of formality and participation by private institutions.250 Kings-
bury et al. observe that global governance is occurring within “hybrid in-
tergovernmental–private arrangements” as well as “administration by
private institutions with regulatory functions,”251 and that, increasingly,
“international bodies make decisions that have direct legal consequences
for individuals or firms without any intervening role for national govern-
ment action.”252 Most tellingly, the authors point out:
international lawyers can no longer credibly argue that there are no
real democracy or legitimacy deficits in global administrative govern-
ance because global regulatory bodies answer to states, and the gov-
ernments of those states answer to their voters and courts. National
administrative lawyers can no longer insist that adequate accounta-
bility for global regulatory governance can always be achieved
246. Daniel Bodansky, Legitimacy in International Law and International Relations, in
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 327 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013); see
also Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 241, at 405 (“‘Legitimacy’ has both a normative and
a sociological meaning.”); Zu¨rn, supra note 241, at 260–61; de Bu´rca, supra note 242, at 349
(proposing both normative and social views of legitimacy).
247. Zu¨rn, supra note 241, at 260.
248. Id.
249. Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Global Governance and Global Administrative
Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2006).
250. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 20 (2005).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 24.
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through the application of domestic administrative law requirements
to domestic regulatory decisions.253
The standard critiques of platform governance reflect many of the
same concerns as have long preoccupied scholars of global governance
and global administrative law. In particular, the procedural critique of
platform governance—which takes a dim view of platforms’ capabilities
to perform governance functions in a manner that is sufficiently delibera-
tive, independent of undue pressure from interested parties, and with ad-
equate procedural safeguards—mirrors many of the concerns expressed
in the global governance literature on legitimacy and accountability.254
The substantive critique, too, reflects a different sort of legitimacy ques-
tion: whether the outcomes of platform decisions are correct or deserve
social or political support.
The literature on global governance is particularly resonant now be-
cause so much of it emerged out of popular unrest and dissatisfaction
with the performance of international institutions. The picture that
emerges from the global governance scholarship is one of secretive, pow-
erful institutions that purported to act in the public’s name and whose
substantive and procedural deficits led them to confront public resistance
and protest. As Richard Stewart and Michelle Badin described the World
Trade Organization in 2009, the organization had confronted “stringent
criticism by civil society organizations and some members for closed deci-
sion-making, an unduly narrow trade focus, domination by powerful
members and economic and financial interests, and disregard of social
and environmental values and the interests of many developing countries
and their citizens.”255
These descriptions bear a striking similarity to the critiques of plat-
forms today—from both the left and the right—as organizations out of
touch with the public mood, unduly focused on the bottom line, domi-
nated by the interests of Brussels and Washington, and oblivious to the
privacy and dignity interests of their users. A fresh approach to questions
of legitimacy and accountability should guide our understanding of the
current moment of profound political and cultural backlash against plat-
forms. Thinking about platform governance through the lens of global
governance is doubly helpful because it both expands the unduly narrow
view of the actors who are performing governance roles and enriches the
253. Id. at 26.
254. Although these two terms are separate, they are often conflated or addressed to-
gether. See, e.g., Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 241, at 415 (arguing that cooperation by
democratic governments provides a “democratic channel of accountability” but is insuffi-
cient to legitimate governance institutions); id. at 426–27 (“It is misleading to say that
global governance institutions are illegitimate because they lack accountability and to sug-
gest that the key to making them legitimate is to make them accountable . . . what might be
called narrow accountability—accountability without provision for contestation of the
terms of accountability—is insufficient for legitimacy.”).
255. Richard B. Stewart & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, The World Trade Organi-
zation and Global Administrative Law 1 (N.Y.U. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Pa-
pers, Paper 166, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1518606 [https://perma.cc/B4JJ-MQQ4].
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vocabulary for considering potential solutions to legitimacy and accounta-
bility gaps.
B. SOLVING LEGITIMACY AND ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEMS
The governance literature makes clear that state intervention is not the
only way to promote accountability and legitimacy for private actors.
Rather than shying away from their global governance role, platforms
could willingly adopt new procedures and methods explicitly designed to
increase their own legitimacy and accountability and to address their crit-
ics. Far from being unprecedented, scholars of global administrative law
have observed that, to “bolster[ ] their legitimacy in the face of growing
political challenges,” some global regulators have turned to administra-
tive law principles and values such as transparency, participation, rea-
soned decision-making, and judicial review in an effort to demonstrate
their own accountability to the governed.256 Indeed, as Facebook has be-
gun to plan for the creation of its oversight board, it has often used the
language of public law, expressing desire to “giv[e] people a voice” and to
conduct effective oversight of decision-making.257
It is not difficult to imagine that online platforms, which face increasing
pressures to create and implement rules and adjudicate disputes about
online speech and privacy, could turn to the principles and values of ad-
ministrative law as a way of enhancing their own legitimacy. As an initial
matter, platforms are already beginning to recognize that they perform a
quasi-regulatory role. This role is not out of place in the Internet govern-
ance arena, although most formal and informal international institutions
of Internet governance focus on the Internet infrastructure rather than
content and privacy issues.258 Global, non-governmental regulatory bod-
ies are already common in the Internet governance space—ICANN being
perhaps the premier example. Other bodies might be seen as private
“meta-regulators” that aim to coordinate among private entities and cre-
ate standards that all can adhere to.259 Meta-regulators are “private re-
256. Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 249, at 4.
257. Zuckerberg, supra note 207. The board has been widely described in the popular
press as a “Supreme Court.” See, e.g., Hanna Kozlowska, Facebook will have a Supreme
Court–like body within a year, QUARTZ (Nov. 15, 2018), https://qz.com/1465898/mark-zuck
erberg-facebook-to-have-a-supreme-court-within-a-year/; Evelyn Douek, Facebook’s New
‘Supreme Court’ Could Revolutionize Online Speech, LAWFARE (Nov. 19, 2018), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/facebooks-new-supreme-court-could-revolutionize-online-speech;
Kate Klonick & Thomas Kadri, How to Make Facebook’s ‘Supreme Court’ Work, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/17/opinion/facebook-supreme-
court-speech.html.
258. But see LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE 9
(2014) (“Traditional power structures increasingly view Internet governance technologies
as mechanisms for controlling global information flows. One Internet governance theme is
the escalating use of Internet governance technologies as a proxy for content control.”).
259. See, e.g., Fabrizio Cafaggi, Transnational Private Regulation: Regulating Global
Regulators, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 214 (Sabino
Cassese ed., 2016) (“Private meta-regulation usually consists of general common principles
to be applied to the regulators that subscribe to them on a voluntary basis. In this case,
regulators become regulated entities by means of the meta-regulator.”).
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gimes in the public interest,” as opposed to “those that aim to produce
purely private benefits for the regulated.”260 For instance, the Global
Network Initiative is a voluntary membership organization that “pro-
vides, among other things, a framework of best practices and an assess-
ment mechanism for evaluating the human rights performance of
companies in the information and communication technologies sector”
and is active on issues related to content regulation.261
1. Transparency
What would it mean to apply the principles and values of administra-
tive law in the context of global platform governance? To begin, plat-
forms could commit to acting more transparently. Platforms already
regularly publish transparency reports that document a range of statistics,
including information about the number and types of requests to take
down content that they receive.262 For instance, Google reports that it
removed almost ten million videos during the first quarter of 2018, over
seven million of which were detected by automated means.263 Google’s
transparency report informs readers that YouTube participates in the
Global Internet Forum’s hash sharing program, and that 98% of videos
“removed for violent extremism” were identified by machine learning.264
But the report provides no information about the actual number of
videos that were removed for “violent extremism,” nor does it document
the number of videos flagged by Internet referral units. Facebook’s trans-
parency report is similarly spotty, revealing that the platform “took ac-
tion on” 1.9 million pieces of content that contained “terrorist
propaganda” in the first quarter of 2018.265 But “taking action” could
mean anything from “removing a piece of content,” flagging content with
260. Id. at 213.
261. Molly Land, Toward an International Law of the Internet, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 393,
445 (2013); see also Luca Belli & Nicolo Zingales, Preview of the 2017 DCPR Outcome:
Platform Regulations (DC on Platform Responsibility), INTERNET GOVERNANCE F., https://
www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/content/preview-of-the-2017-dcpr-outcome-platform-
regulations-dc-on-platform-responsibility [https://perma.cc/CW4Y-9DUG] (“[A]t the 2014
Internet Governance Forum, the Dynamic Coalition on Platform Responsibility was cre-
ated. The DCPR is a multistakeholder group established under the auspices of the United
Nations Internet Governance Forum dedicated to the analysis of the role and responsibili-
ties of online platforms from a technical, legal, social or economic perspective. Since its
inception, DCPR has facilitated and nurtured a cross-disciplinary analysis of the challenges
linked to the emergence of digital platforms and has promoted a participatory effort aimed
at suggesting policy solutions.”).
262. See, e.g., Facebook Transparency Report, FACEBOOK, https://transparency.face
book.com/ [https://perma.cc/RC9X-LDKD] (last visited Feb. 9, 2019); Transparency Re-
port, GOOGLE, https://transparencyreport.google.com/ [https://perma.cc/BSV4-4VN6] (last
visited Feb. 9, 2019); Twitter Transparency Report, TWITTER, https://transparency.twitter
.com/en.html [https://perma.cc/L6QX-4LWT] (last visited Feb. 9, 2019).
263. YouTube Community Guidelines Enforcement, GOOGLE, https://transparencyre-
port.google.com/youtube-policy/overview?hl=en [https://perma.cc/GT6P-H8DA] (last vis-
ited Feb. 9, 2019).
264. Id.
265. Hard Questions: What Are We Doing to Stay Ahead of Terrorists?, FACEBOOK
(Nov. 11, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/11/staying-ahead-of-terrorists/.
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a “warning,” or disabling an entire account.266
Although platform transparency reports are helpful to inform the pub-
lic, the incomplete information they contain makes them of limited use in
understanding how platform governance actually operates.267 A fuller
embrace of transparency principles would not only suggest that platforms
should publish more granular information in their transparency reports,
but also that they could coordinate with each other to make those reports
more meaningful to the public.268 A private organization such as the
Global Network Initiative could easily serve as a “meta-regulator” to set
standards for the kinds of information that transparency reports ought to
convey. This is especially important because platforms are, indeed, al-
ready coordinating—through the Global Internet Forum, hash sharing,
and other cooperative arrangements—both with each other and with gov-
ernment. In order to be truly informative, transparency reports should
shed light on the ways that these arrangements impact platform
governance.
Platforms could also embrace more robust transparency in ways ex-
tending beyond their ordinary reporting. Indeed, Google’s experience im-
plementing the right to be forgotten illustrates the limitations of
transparency reporting in shedding light on platform governance. While
Google does publish periodic reports about content deletion under the
right to be forgotten,269 the information is fairly limited in scope, showing
the numbers of requests and URLs affected and the types of requesters.
The public lacks access to the information most critical to understand the
platform’s implementation of the right to be forgotten: Google’s criteria
for deciding whether to delete information. The report maintains that
Google “assess[es] each request on a case-by-case basis” and sets forth
“[a] few common material factors” the platform uses, but the internal
266. Community Standards Enforcement Preliminary Report, FACEBOOK, https://trans-
parency.facebook.com/community-standards-enforcement (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
267. See Hannah Bloch-Wehba, How much of your online life should police have access
to? SCOTUS prepares to weigh in, VOX (Nov. 29, 2017, 8:33 AM), https://www.vox.com/
the-big-idea/2017/11/22/16687420/fourth-amendment-online-searches-constitution-face
book-gag-orders [https://perma.cc/VW2X-D38Z] (observing, in the context of electronic
surveillance data, that transparency reports “provide the most useful and granular informa-
tion” available to the public, despite their limitations).
268. See Alex Feerst, Implementing Transparency About Content Moderation,
TECHDIRT (Feb. 1, 2018, 1:38 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20180131/221823391
32/implementing-transparency-about-content-moderation.shtml [https://perma.cc/8UC8-
6SNX]. Civil society groups have already called on platforms to provide more detailed
information and more robust notice and appeal mechanisms for content moderation deci-
sions. The Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and Accountability in Content Modera-
tion (May 7, 2018), https://newamericadotorg.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/Santa_Clara_
Principles.pdf; see also Spandana Singh & Kevin Bankston, The Transparency Reporting
Toolkit: Content Takedown Reporting, OPEN TECH. INST. (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www
.newamerica.org/oti/reports/transparency-reporting-toolkit-content-takedown-reporting/
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criteria that platform employees actually rely upon are not public.270
Even the company’s more detailed report, Three Years of the Right to Be
Forgotten, provides fairly minimal information about how the company
actually considers the criteria it uses to process takedown requests.271 The
report notes that this “emphasis on privacy creates a fundamental tension
with standards for reproducible science.”272
In a recent case in the United Kingdom, in which two anonymous busi-
nessmen successfully sought to compel Google to delist links concerning
prior convictions of criminal offenses, the High Court noted that “Google
relies on a number of factors” not present in the Article 29 Working Party
criteria: “the nature of the third party publishers; the public availability of
the information; the nature of the information and the alleged inaccura-
cies; the claimant’s business activities and their relationship with the in-
formation published at the URLs complained of; and the claimant’s own
online descriptions of himself.”273 The lack of clarity regarding these cri-
teria, which only emerged at trial,274 simply underscores the complexity
of making right to be forgotten decisions—and the public’s urgent need
to understand how these decisions are made.275
Finally, platforms could operate more transparently by publicly ac-
knowledging and justifying their decisions to take action to limit access to
content online. For example, platforms could publish a brief summary of
the facts raised by each request to delist search results, the analysis, and
the result. Google already publishes sample requests in its transparency
report, including a one-sentence summary of the request and a one-sen-
tence summary of the outcome.276 This information is presented at a suf-
ficient level of generality to avoid re-identifying the requester, but
illustrates the kinds of questions the company confronts when it deter-
mines whether to delist search results. Unfortunately, however, no corol-
lary explanation exists for content against which platforms take action
pursuant to their own ToS. Indeed, platforms have made very little infor-
mation public to explain their own implementation of their rules and
guidelines on ToS takedowns and community standards; what has become
public is largely due to leaks in the press.277
270. Id.
271. BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 173, at 2.
272. Id. at 4.
273. NT1 & NT2 v. Google LLC [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) [¶ 131] (UK), https://www
.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/nt1-Nnt2-v-google-2018-Eewhc-799-QB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V2A8-GMSP].
274. Gareth Corfield, Here is how Google handles Right To Be Forgotten requests, REG-
ISTER (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/03/19/google_right_to_be_forgot
ten_request_process/ [https://perma.cc/7FH9-VW3C].
275. It remains to be seen whether the court’s decision in NT1 & NT2 will result in
Google embracing the Working Party guidelines and abandoning its own internal rules.
276. Search removals under European privacy law, supra note 269.
277. See Julia Angwin & Hannes Grassegger, Facebook’s Secret Censorship Rules Pro-
tect White Men From Hate Speech But Not Black Children, PROPUBLICA (June 28, 2017,
5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-hate-speech-censorship-internal-
documents-algorithms [https://perma.cc/N3Q9-E3X6].
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2. Reasoned Decision-Making
Beyond simple transparency, additional disclosures are vital for plat-
forms to demonstrate that they satisfy another core principle of adminis-
trative law: reasoned decision-making. Platforms’ failure to publish
information about how, when, and why they take action regarding online
content simply raises suspicions that they are applying their own (secret)
rules in ways that are arbitrary or baseless.278 That platforms routinely
reach opposite conclusions about specific instances of online content un-
derscores the public’s perception of these decisions as random and illegit-
imate.279 As Sarah Roberts has observed, moreover, decision-making
about what content “is acceptable and what is not is a complex process,
beyond the capabilities of software or algorithms alone,” yet commercial
content moderation still largely operates behind the scenes.280 Far from
justifying their decisions to the public, platforms continue to treat their
governance mechanisms as if they were proprietary tools that did not af-
fect public rights.
3. Participation
Nor have platforms embraced mechanisms that would enhance the
public’s ability to participate in governance, either directly or through
representatives. When they have done so, platforms have not demon-
strated that they take participatory governance seriously. For instance,
from 2009 through 2012 Facebook experimented with participatory gov-
ernance by asking users to vote on a variety of policy changes. But the
platform’s rules for engagement required that 30% of active Facebook
users had to participate for the results of the process to be effective.281 By
requiring such an astronomical turnout threshold—by 2012 Facebook had
more than a billion users—the platform virtually ensured that its par-
ticipatory governance mechanisms would fall short. Facebook’s prior fail-
ures, however, appear not to have dissuaded the platform from invoking
the value of “public participation” in support of its proposed oversight
278. See, e.g., Kevin Bankston & Liz Woolery, We Need To Shine A Light On Private
Online Censorship, TECHDIRT (Jan. 31, 2018, 1:29 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20180130/22212639127/we-need-to-shine-light-private-online-censorship.shtml [https://per
ma.cc/8SVC-88R3] (discussing how public scrutiny of platforms’ “bizarrely idiosyncratic
rule sets” could “guard against discriminatory impacts on oft-marginalized communities”).
279. See, e.g., Aja Romano, Twitter’s stance on Infowars’ Alex Jones should be a mo-
ment of reckoning for users, VOX (Aug. 8, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/8/
17662774/twitter-alex-jones-jack-dorsey [https://perma.cc/PU3W-73YK] (reporting that,
while Apple, Facebook, YouTube, and other platforms had banned far-right conspiracy
theorist Alex Jones and InfoWars from their platforms, Twitter had not).
280. Sarah T. Roberts, Behind the Screen: The Hidden Digital Labor of Commercial
Content Moderation 13–15 (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign), http://hdl.handle.net/2142/50401 [https://perma.cc/V73M-Y9Q2].
281. Severin Engelmann et al., A Democracy Called Facebook? Participation as a Pri-
vacy Strategy on Social Media, in PRIVACY TECHNOLOGIES AND POLICY: 6TH ANNUAL PRI-
VACY FORUM, APF 2018, BARCELONA, SPAIN, JUNE 13-14, 2018, REVISED SELECTED
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Informed by the development of more participatory global governance
mechanisms by international organizations, networks, and other hybrid
arrangements, however, platforms could readily adapt a variety of meth-
ods of boosting public participation. For instance, platforms could adopt
rigorous “notice-and-comment” procedures for changes to their privacy
policies, ToS, and community standards, to give the public input concern-
ing the kinds of information that are made available online and collected
and used by advertisers and other third parties.
Platforms could also expand the opportunities for civil society to par-
ticipate in platform governance. Currently, platforms appear to engage
with some NGOs as civil liberties partners, while they partner with others
as “trusted flaggers”—and the two groups have very little overlap or in-
teraction. This method of engaging with civil society is incomplete; as
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have written, NGOs and civil society
networks will often engage in overlapping or conflicting “transnational-
transgovernmental coalitions.”283 Platforms could, therefore, explore
more robust avenues for participation by civil society in formulating and
expounding policies and rules that will, by dint of practical operation,
have global effects. Avenues for participation in adjudication could also
be broadened: platforms could appoint an “amicus curiae” to help make
more informed and robust decisions in difficult cases regarding content or
privacy.
As with reasoned decision-making, however, platforms’ ability to
demonstrate that they take participation seriously requires additional
transparency as well. Full participation by the public and civil society is,
indeed, contingent on transparency: as Richard Stewart points out, “infor-
mation about an organization’s ongoing and proposed decisions and poli-
cies is essential for outsiders to know when and where to make
submissions on proposed decisions and how to make such submissions
effective.”284 Moreover, civil society participation in some global govern-
ance contexts has been “sharply contested,” with advocates asserting that
participation can remedy democratic deficits and detractors contending
that civil society organizations tend to support the policies sought by de-
veloped countries.285
4. Judicial Review
Finally, platform governance could be made more accountable and
democratically legitimate were it subjected to judicial review. Under the
current framework, an individual who requests that a search result be
282. Zuckerberg, supra note 207 (describing how the board will “giv[e] people a
voice”).
283. Keohane & Nye, supra note 241, at 271.
284. Richard B. Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Ac-
countability, Participation, and Responsiveness, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 211, 263 (2014).
285. Steven Kochevar, Amici Curiae in Civil Law Jurisdictions, 122 YALE L.J. 1653,
1658 (2013).
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delisted pursuant to the right to be forgotten has standing to contest a
platform’s failure to comply with the data protection authority in their
country of residence or in court. However, the author or webmaster of
the delisted result has no avenue to seek administrative or judicial re-
dress.286 Perhaps more troubling, the public has no opportunity to be
heard on the deletion of information from search results, although Article
10 of the European Convention on Human Rights stipulates that the pub-
lic has the right to “receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”287 The result
is that judicial review of platforms’ decisions on the right to be forgotten
is available only for one of the affected parties.
Nor is judicial review available when platforms take action against con-
tent or activity that violates their community standards or ToS. Although
some litigants are testing the limits of this obstacle in U.S. courts, seeking
to transform this into an issue with a legal remedy, they have so far not
prevailed.288 When content is deleted pursuant to a decision that it vio-
lates a platform’s ToS, it is not even clear that platforms always provide
users with an opportunity to contest that decision within the platform
itself.289 Even assuming that platforms do notify posters that their con-
tent will be taken down, numerous commentators have pointed out that
relying on counter-notices by users is not effective to protect lawful con-
tent.290 Some new developments in foreign courts, however, suggest that
users may have remedies against platforms that wrongfully delete con-
tent. In Germany, the courts have long applied the Drittwirkung doctrine,
which recognizes that public law values influence private rights.291 In at
least three German cases in 2018, courts held that, under the
Drittwirkung doctrine, Facebook must observe fundamental rights when
it determines whether to delete content pursuant to its ToS.292
The German cases suggest that, at least under some national laws, indi-
viduals will have standing to contest removal decisions in court. In many
cases, this may raise significant questions about intermediary immunity as
well as about platforms’ claims that they act as curators or editors of con-
tent themselves.293 But remedying the one-sided nature of judicial review
286. Guidelines on the Implementation of Google Spain, supra note 159, at 10.
287. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms art. 10(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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implement “rigorous procedural safeguards” to protect against over-removal of speech).
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for platform governance is a good thing when it comes to checking gov-
ernment coercion. If platforms’ content moderation decisions increas-
ingly result from government pressure, enhancing standing to contest
removal decisions will provide a vital check. Even where such standing
does not exist—as in the United States—platforms could still work to
remedy the one-sided nature of judicial review for platform governance
by committing to litigate test cases in which they seek to assert the rights
of their users. In the surveillance context, platforms have already seen the
utility of initiating litigation on behalf of users, potentially in part because
standing up for user privacy is “a valuable marketing tool.”294 Just so,
platforms could seek to stand up for their users’ expressive rights in court
as well.
C. OBSTACLES TO ACCOUNTABILITY
The above Part articulated a range of options for platforms to bolster
their accountability and legitimacy with the public. However, none of
these mechanisms are band-aids. Instead, platforms should adopt a range
of additional measures to promote legitimacy and accountability. For the
reasons set forth above, moreover, platforms must begin by making more
information public: robust transparency is a precondition for public par-
ticipation in policy and rulemaking, and is doubly required for public con-
fidence in the quality of platform decision-making.
Yet the laws that create the obligations for private governance actually
in some ways prevent the development of systems that could be accounta-
ble. In other words, the applicable legal regimes obstruct the application
of safeguards that would constrain discretion and enhance democratic
accountability.
First, applicable frameworks for content takedowns favor speed over
accuracy. This balance is at the core of calls for more “proactive,” auto-
mated measures in the context of hate speech and terrorist speech.295 It is
equally clear, however, that “[a]utomated techniques will block some le-
gitimate content.”296 At bottom, frameworks that favor speech and auto-
mation will make it difficult for platforms to engage in the kind of careful,
reasoned decision-making that is necessary to make informed decisions
about online speech, and the development of proprietary algorithmic
blocking tools will further hamper public understanding.
Second, and relatedly, applicable legal frameworks presumptively favor
decisions to delete content over decisions to maintain content in edge
294. Cooperation or Resistance?, supra note 62, at 1726; see also Rozenshtein, supra
note 1; Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Exposing Secret Searches: A First Amendment Right of Ac-
cess to Electronic Surveillance Orders, 93 WASH. L. REV. 145, 160 (2018) (describing how
Microsoft initiated litigation to challenge the secrecy of electronic surveillance demands).
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cases. In the context of the right to be forgotten, for instance, Google
bears no responsibility for wrongfully delisting content. Google has no
counter-notice mechanism to notify the author of a delisted page regard-
ing a right to be forgotten decision. Moreover, neither that author nor the
public has standing to contest a removal decision.297 But sanctions for
failing to delist content can be quite stringent: data protection authorities
may fine intermediaries, and right to be forgotten requesters may bring
suit. This creates incentives for companies to err on the side of deletion—
precisely the risk that intermediary liability has always raised. Identical
risks of over-deletion exist in the contexts of hate speech and terrorist
speech. The lopsided incentives reflect that parties have wildly varying
incentives and opportunities to challenge decisions to remove—or not re-
move—online content.
Third, the law discourages transparency and encourages opacity regard-
ing how platforms reach decisions concerning online speech and privacy.
For instance, Google has struggled to inform the public regarding right to
be forgotten requests because to do so often would constitute a further
infringement on the privacy right of the data subject.298 It is particularly
difficult to attribute responsibility for censorship in the contexts of hate
speech and terrorist speech, in which governments exert considerable
pressure on platforms to delete content pursuant to their own ToS rather
than under public law. In the context of the right to be forgotten, where
platforms administer takedown schemes and adjudicate thousands of in-
dividualized disputes behind closed doors, understanding rule making
and dispute resolution is practically impossible because of corporate
opacity and the large number of demands. Lack of transparency itself,
then, can prompt legitimacy concerns for companies engaged in policing
online speech.
VI. CONCLUSION
Far from making the Internet more accountable, more legitimate, and
more responsive to users, online self-governance and self-regulation have
in fact obscured the boundaries between state and private actors. This
confusion makes it increasingly difficult to attribute responsibility for on-
line censorship and to disentangle platform governance from coercive ac-
tions taken by states across the globe. Because the public lacks key
information about how, when, and at whose direction platform govern-
ance is taking place, it is extremely difficult for the outside observer to
discern what is going on, and to distinguish private action from govern-
ment pressure.
This doesn’t have to be the case. Platforms themselves can embrace
accountability mechanisms that would make their governance decisions
more accountable and more legitimate to their users and to the public.
297. Keller, Notice and Takedown, supra note 215.
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Indeed, as platforms increasingly seek to subdue popular backlash and
ingratiate themselves with consumers, there are good reasons for them to
take measures to “boost their legitimacy and effectiveness.”299 Adher-
ence to the principles and values of administrative law can subject even
informal, private, global governance to rule of law principles.
Accountability may not come naturally to the tech industry. Although
private governance has long transpired behind closed doors, platforms
will need to resist the impulse to operate in the dark, instead opting for
meaningful disclosure practices and other transparency mechanisms that
expose their own rulemaking and adjudicatory procedures to scrutiny.
Rather than ignoring user input, platforms will need to actively solicit
participation by users and civil society organizations in public-facing and
public-regarding ways. Most difficult of all, these measures will require
platforms to resist legal requirements that prevent or block them from
developing robust safeguards and accountability mechanisms.
But platforms must take on these tasks themselves rather than waiting
for government to act, because to wait is to allow the structures of private
ordering to be coopted by state censors. Obscurity is not simply the result
of bureaucracy: it is a key characteristic of collateral censorship, which
relies on secrecy and an uninformed public for its success. As we find that
would-be government censors all over the globe are increasingly relying
on platforms’ own internal rules, procedures, and decision-making mech-
anisms, it should be clear: now is the time to act.
299. Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 250, at 16.
